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THE COST OF NOTHING TRUMPS
THE VALUE OF EVERYTHING:
THE FAILURE OF REGULATORY
ECONOMICS TO KEEP PACE
WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
Adam M. Finkel, Sc.D.*
The entire U.S. federal regulatory apparatus, especially that part devoted to
reducing (or deciding not to reduce) risks to the environment, health, and safety
(EHS), relies increasingly on judgments of whether each regulation would yield
benefits in excess of its costs. These judgments depend in turn upon empirical
analysis of the potential increases in longevity, quality of life, and environmental
quality that the regulation can confer, and also of the economic resources needed
to “purchase” those benefits—analyses whose quality can range from extremely
fine to disappointingly poor. The quality of a risk analysis (from which the bene-
fits of control are derived) or of an economic analysis depends on attributes they
share in common, such as the complexity and rigor of the data collection and
mathematical modeling, the transparency by which the assumptions used are dis-
closed, and the humility of the conclusions drawn (particularly the care taken to
acknowledge uncertainty in the estimate). This Article is part of a series of inves-
tigations by a multidisciplinary team of scholars, examining whether regulatory
cost analysis may be systematically less rigorous, transparent, and humble as com-
pared to the corresponding analyses of risk upon which regulations are jointly
based. In this particular study, I contrast the attention paid to depicting uncer-
tainty on the “cost side” versus the “risk side” of cost-benefit analysis, and show
that regulatory economics has steadily remained about ten to fifteen years behind
risk analysis with respect to this important attribute of analytic quality. Various
sections of the Article explain why overconfident pronouncements about cost or
risk can thwart sensible decisionmaking, demonstrate how an unbalanced ap-
proach to analyzing risks versus cost is untenable, and trace the history of at-
tempts to improve the estimation of regulatory cost uncertainty both inside and
outside the major federal EHS regulatory agencies. The core of this Article is a
combination of a statistical analysis and a set of case studies, showing how much
improvement remains to be made on the “cost side” of regulatory uncertainty
analysis, and providing various sets of reasons why this particular deficiency arose
and persists. If decisionmakers and the public are not informed that the true
magnitudes of regulatory cost may be much higher or (more likely) much lower
than the overconfident estimates provided with current regulatory analyses, they
* Senior Fellow and Executive Director of the Penn Program on Regulation at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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cannot express their desires for more or less regulatory stringency in light of the
resulting uncertainty in net benefit.
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INTRODUCTION
What does it really mean for an individual, or a society, to undertake an
action—or to leave well enough alone—because “it does more good than
harm?” And how do we come to such a determination with some semblance
of serious reflection? When the action involves trying to reduce risk to
human health, safety, or the environment, increasingly this most basic for-
mulation of a “moral algebra”1 has acquired the structure and rigor of cost-
benefit thinking. Even where regulatory agencies are not required by their
organic statutes to try to estimate or maximize net benefits, the expectation
that benefits and costs will at least be discussed for informational purposes
has firmly taken hold.2 Actions, or inactions that perpetuate the status quo,
come with costs and benefits, and our society is devoting enormous effort to
estimating the magnitude of these goods and harms and debating how we
should act in light of them.3
The fundamental optimism (some would call it the fundamental hubris)
of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is that when we estimate quantitatively the
goods and harms of a proposed policy, rational discussion can ensue about
whether it is wise as well as whether it is ethical. Under an extremely “hard”
version of cost-benefit balancing, the wisdom of any policy could be gauged
by determining whether the point estimate for total benefit is larger than
the point estimate for total cost; under a “softer” version of cost-benefit
balancing, the estimates would be considered among other inputs.
But what if we habitually estimate the benefits with greater or lesser care than
we estimate the costs? Any analysis, of course, can contain errors, no analysis
can guarantee that a sound decision will flow from it, and no decision, no
matter how sound, can guarantee a favorable outcome. An analysis in which
the appraisal of one side of the cost-benefit ledger is routinely superior to
1. KERRY S. WALTERS, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND HIS GODS 124 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2014 UTAH
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2442357.
3. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2014 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENE-
FITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES (2014).
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the other side, however, makes decisions more precarious than they should
be. This Article, the capstone publication in a series of papers from a mul-
tidisciplinary project team studying the treatment of economics and science
in CBA,4 explores the possibility that the estimates of regulatory5 cost de-
veloped for actions contemplated by the U.S. federal and state governments
may be systematically less rigorous, transparent, and humble6 than the estimates
of risk reduction (regulatory benefit) they accompany.
As I will discuss, the strong possibility that regulatory cost economics is
the weakest link in CBA is more than a bit ironic, given that some of the
salutary changes in quantitative risk assessment (QRA) over the past thirty
years have been impelled by criticism from economists.7 But the “poaching”
by economists onto scientific turf has also led QRA into some of its blind
alleys and backwaters, in my opinion, including the pursuit of less “con-
servative” risk estimates without regard to the accuracy of this charge or the
usefulness of less precautionary—and perhaps less accurate—estimates in
decisionmaking.8 Which propitious changes might occur if scientists with
4. The project was funded by the Human and Social Dynamics of Change program,
National Science Foundation (NSF), under grant #0756539. I gratefully acknowledge the
support and advice provided by NSF, and that of my colleagues on the project at Resources
for the Future, Applied Biomathematics, Decision Research, Clark University, University of
California-Riverside, and Texas A&M University. Able research assistance in preliminary
scoring of the 25 EPA rules (see Part VIII infra) was provided by Penn Law students Alison
Bonelli, Catherine Courcy, Matthew Lee, and Julie Xu, and expert editorial assistance was
provided by Ben Meltzer. Published versions and pre-publication drafts of the 19 articles
written for this project are available at http://www.tinyurl.com/finkelnsf; the site also con-
tains the table of contents for the book DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS?, partially funded by this
NSF grant.
5. This Article will concentrate on traditional regulatory instruments; however,
henceforth the term “regulation” should be taken to also mean other types of interventions
that governments require or encourage. Cap-and-trade systems, labels and other informa-
tion-disclosure programs, voluntary programs enrolling excellent firms for special recogni-
tion, and the like, all are intended to confer benefits on society, and all may come at a cost.
6. See CLINTON J. ANDREWS, HUMBLE ANALYSIS: THE PRACTICE OF JOINT FACT-FINDING
(2002).
7. For example, the long-awaited “unification” of non-cancer and cancer risk assess-
ment by making the former mimic the latter and produce estimates of probability-of-harm
rather than “bright lines” was in large part spurred on by economists who complained, with
good reason, that bright-line assessments do not lend themselves to benefits valuation. See,
e.g., Proceedings of the Workshop on the Convergence of Risk Assessment and Socio-Eco-
nomic Analysis to Better Inform Chemical Risk Management Decisions 42-44 (May 1-2,
2000), http://www.riskworld.com/Nreports/2000/RA-EAWorkshopMay2000.pdf; see also
RICHARD B. BELZER, MERCATUS CENTER, RISK ASSESSMENT, SAFETY ASSESSMENT, AND THE ESTIMA-
TION OF REGULATORY BENEFITS 21 (2012).
8. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1, 1990—MARCH 31, 1991, 13-26 (the principal author of the chapter on
risk assessment was economist Richard Belzer); Kenny S. Crump and Robin Gentry, A
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economics training were to turn the tables, and begin to shine a light on the
possible deficiencies on the “cost side” of CBA? The Sermon on the Mount
contains this admonition: “And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy
brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?”9 This
project is in some sense an attempt to help remove one of the “beams” while
we continue to worry about the various “motes” that also plague the regula-
tory analysis process.
The central theme of this Article is that costs matter. That proposition
should be uncontroversial, even for readers who reject the entire enterprise
of comparing benefits to costs. Even for the most rigid forms of the “pre-
cautionary principle,”10 it is sensible to try to achieve our goals in the least
expensive way possible. And because costs matter, we should have some clue
what they really are—or, less pejoratively, how uncertain they are, who bears
them, what second-order consequences they set in motion, etc. And yet,
time after time, leaders in CBA scholarship and practice gloss over this half of the
ledger as if it is a solved problem. For a recent and representative quote to
introduce this Article, consider one of the first writings of Cass Sunstein
after he left his position as Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), also known as the “Regulatory Czar”:
It is true that even if we accept cost-benefit analysis, serious ques-
tions remain. Some of those issues are scientific. If we cut emis-
sions of certain air pollutants, what, exactly, are the public-health
benefits? Other questions are economic. Suppose that a rule would
save 30 lives a year. How do we turn that figure into monetary
equivalents? These and other issues have a philosophical dimen-
sion. How should we deal with values that are hard or impossible to
quantify, such as human dignity? And should our valuations change
if a rule would mostly benefit members of future generations?11
Response to OMB’s Comments Regarding OSHA’s Approach to Risk Assessment in Support of
OSHA’s Final Rule on Cadmium, 13 RISK ANALYSIS, 487-89 (1993).
9. Matthew 7:3.
10. See, e.g., Environmental Justice Requires Precautionary Action: Hearing before the Cali-
fornia Environmental Protection Agency Advisory Committee on Environmental Justice (2003)
(statement of Peter Montague, Director of Environmental Research Foundation); Adam M.
Finkel, I Thought You’d Never Ask: Structuring Regulatory Decisions to Stimulate Demand for
Better Risk Science and Better Cost Economics, EUR. J. OF RISK RES. (forthcoming 2015) (discuss-
ing a rigid precautionary principle as one of the lowest rungs on a ladder of analytic
sophistication).
11. Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG, Sept.
12, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-cost-benefit
-analysis.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
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So one of the leading national scholars on CBA believes that there are
“scientific” and “economic” problems left to solve—but notice that all the
problems Sunstein mentions12 are on the benefits side of the ledger (see
Part I infra for a definition parsing benefits and costs). What about the
process, discipline, and art of estimating regulatory costs? In this Article, I
explore how scientists may tiptoe in where economists fear to—or choose
not to—tread.
I. DEFINITIONAL PREFACE
There are many ways to define “benefits” and “costs,” some of which
would introduce enormous confusion into this series of explorations of how
analysts work across the two domains. Some attempts to parse the two
terms lead to double-counting, the failure to count important things, or
both. For a recent example of such a conceptual muddle, consider this para-
graph from economist Eduardo Porter:
The government has to predict how much climate change will cost
us in the future—through lost agricultural productivity, poorer
health, bigger hurricanes and the like—to figure out how much we
should spend today. It does so through a measure called the “social
cost of carbon,” which captures the added damage that will be
caused by adding one more ton of CO2 into the air. The govern-
ment’s estimate of the cost to our society covers a wide range of $5
to $68 a ton and increases over time. Several economists have con-
cluded that cutting carbon emissions via fuel-efficiency standards
may be even more expensive.13
Here, Porter uses “cost” to mean the damage done by an externality,
and then only briefly switches gears to refer to the cost of averting that
damage as possibly “expensive.” There is nothing per se illogical about say-
ing “it will cost us a lot to avoid these costs,” but such an approach doesn’t
really encourage cost-benefit thinking (any more than the phraseology “we
could benefit by buying these benefits” would).
Another common way of parsing the two areas is to colloquially define
“costs” as any unfavorable consequences and “benefits” as any favorable
12. A major theme of this Article will be the irony that much of the cost-benefit appa-
ratus (scholars, practitioners, and policy stakeholders) seems to regard the estimation of
regulatory costs as a “solved problem,” when in fact it may be the weakest analytic link of all.
13. Eduardo Porter, Taxes Show One Way to Save Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, www
.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/fuel-efficiency-standards-have-costs-of-their-own.html.
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ones.14 This can be a coherent way to divide the ledger while avoiding
double-counting. However, it also blinds the discussion to two important
concepts—the notion of “disbenefit” and the notion of “negative cost”—that
can greatly clarify the role and the turmoil of CBA.15
In this project, our team has defined these terms so as to place on the
“benefit” side of the ledger all the changes—both positive and negative—in
outcomes not traded in markets. In other words, the health, safety, environ-
mental, and other conditions that are altered by a regulation—once mone-
tized—constitute the regulation’s “benefits.” Note that, under this
definition, some non-market benefits can be negative,16 and the interven-
tion as a whole may even have negative total benefit, not just negative net
benefit. On the “cost” side of the ledger, we place all of the changes, im-
pelled by the regulation, in resources that are traded in markets. In other
words, the costs are the resources that are consumed or reallocated so that
society can “buy” the benefits. As I will discuss in detail, these changes
involve much more than the monetary resources some may be required ex-
pend in order to comply with the regulation. These “compliance costs” are a
central part of the concept of regulatory cost, but, as with benefits, any
given component of total cost can be positive or negative. Producers or
consumers whose economic welfare decreases as a result of a regulation in-
cur positive costs, while those whose welfare increases incur negative costs.
If the latter outweigh the former, the regulation as a whole may have nega-
tive costs along with positive benefits.
More simply put, the benefits are the results of the intervention and
the costs are the resources marshaled to attain them. For the purpose of
examining analytic activity in the federal and state regulatory systems, our
definition has the advantage of usefully dividing the work and responsibili-
ties of analysts in two different ways: (1) regulatory economists estimate
regulatory costs (in dollars, although the dollars are conceived of as oppor-
tunity costs), while risk scientists estimate regulatory benefits (in “natural
units” such as lives saved, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) conferred,
14. See, e.g., Regulatory Improvement Act, S. 746, 106th Cong. §621 (1999) (defining
“cost” as “the reasonably identifiable significant adverse effects, quantifiable and nonquantifi-
able, including social, health, safety, environmental, economic, and distributional effects, that
are expected to result from implementation of, or compliance with, a rule”).
15. An example of a “disbenefit” is an increase in one risk set in motion by the attempt
to reduce another risk. See infra note 16. An example of a “negative cost” is the economic
good fortune to some that often accompanies, or offsets, or dwarfs, the monetary “hits” that
others must bear when society intervenes to correct a market failure.
16. This is the case especially if the regulation exacerbates one or more risks in pursuit
of the reduction of other risks. See, e.g., RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); infra Part VI.
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habitat preserved, visibility improved, etc.); and (2) economists also work
on the “benefits side,” because traditionally the act of monetization (con-
verting benefits from natural units to dollars, in order to compare benefits
to costs) is carried out by economists. Table 1 presents a hypothetical regu-
lation, where a variety of costs and benefits are parsed according to this
preferred structure.
TABLE 1. A COHERENT PARSING OF BENEFITS AND COSTS
Benefits Costs
Reduced emissions of CO2 and air toxics, leading to
“lives saved” (and benefits from reduced morbidity),
slower trajectory of climate change (note: perhaps
slightly offset by “rebound” effect of more miles
driven)
Plastic costs more than steel (reduced consumer and
producer surplus in car sector)
Steel plant closures
Increased highway traffic fatalities Unemployed workers hired by plastics sector
Reduced dependence on imported oil “Innovation drag” as automakers are forced to 
divert resources to making cars so as to address an 
externality rather than profit
Managerial time diverted to externality
Innovations in design having unanticipated positive 
effects on consumer and producer surplus
Note: This table depicts the costs and benefits of a hypothetical (fanciful) proposal to require car bodies 
to be made of lightweight materials such that every model achieves an additional three miles per gallon. 
Italicized (“good”) entries are either positive benefits or negative (offsetting) costs; 
non-italicized entries are positive costs or negative (offsetting) benefits. There are effects that 
“spillover” across any conceptual firewall one might draw—for example, foregone agricultural 
productivity if climate does not warm as much as predicted is either a “negative benefit” of the policy or a 
positive cost.
This Article will remark only peripherally on the rigor with which risk-
reduction benefits, once they are estimated, are then monetized. By parsing
terms this way, we will essentially be contrasting the analytic work of scien-
tists (who estimate benefits, albeit in “natural units” rather than in dollars)
and of economists (who, among other functions, estimate costs).17
17. No single way to parse benefits and costs is wholly satisfactory. In particular, there
is spillover between the two categories. For example, non-market benefits can impel changes
in market outcomes, as in the increased productivity (leading to increased economic growth,
which is a “negative cost”) of persons whose health is improved via the regulatory benefits
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The remainder of this Article will discuss four fundamental ways in
which the estimation of costs and benefits can proceed with vastly different
degrees of rigor, care, and transparency. It will present results from an anal-
ysis of several dozen major U.S. federal health, safety, and environmental
regulations, exploring to what extent the analytic treatment of costs—as op-
posed to benefits—has in fact been markedly or systematically less rigorous,
primarily with respect to the first of the four phenomena—uncertainty. It
will explore why these differences may have arisen and may persist, and will
make specific recommendations for harmonizing the analytic treatment of
costs and benefits where solid reasons do not exist for any discrepancies.
Finally, it will sketch out a program of additional research to expand our
results and explore their implications for public perception of risks, costs,
and decisions. The goal of this project is to suggest that cost-benefit analy-
sis as currently performed may be incompatible with itself, and to suggest
improvements to remedy this situation.
II. FOUR PHENOMENA THAT SURROUND BOTH RISK ASSESSMENT
AND COST ASSESSMENT
The larger project to which this Article is a contribution considers four
areas where QRA has faced (and to some extent, surmounted) analytical
and ethical challenges. Risk assessors and regulatory economists must con-
front these four phenomena but tend to confront them differently. We hope
that comparing these perspectives will help improve the practice of regula-
tory economics, and thence CBA more generally. The four phenomena that
both risk and cost assessment must confront include:
• Uncertainty: should total benefit (or total cost) be quantified and
communicated as a single point estimate, a range, a probability
density function (pdf), or multiple pdfs?
• Interindividual Variability: should benefit (or cost) be disaggre-
gated so as to depict the variation in benefits (or costs) that dif-
ferent individuals or different segments of society will actually
face, or should analysts implicitly assume that we all face the
same risk (or that we all bear the same cost)?18
attained. Note also that both benefits and costs are flows that persist over time, rather than
static events.
18. Once a regulatory system acknowledges interindividual variability, the two remain-
ing phenomena (utility and equity) must be dealt with, although they are dealt with by
default if variability is ignored. This results in linear valuation and uniform weighting, which
is of course a form of weighting like any other. See Carl Cranor & Adam M. Finkel, Toward
Recognizing Individual Benefits and Costs in Cost-Benefit Analysis (2014) (in review, JOUR-
NAL OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS).
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• Utility: should the implicit function relating the magnitude of risk
(or of cost) to the magnitude of harm or disutility it causes be
linear throughout the entire range of individual risk (or cost)
levels? Alternatively, should de minimus individual risks (or de
minimus costs) be treated differently, and/or should extremely
large (i.e., intolerable) individual risks (or costs) be treated
differently?
• Equity: should we aggregate the benefits (or costs) to each indi-
vidual in the population—having implicitly or explicitly con-
verted them into units reflecting disutility—by imposing equal
weights on each person without regard to covariates such as age,
race, socioeconomic status, etc., or should we apply non-uniform
weights?
This Article concentrates on the first of the four phenomena—uncer-
tainty. Although there are areas of overlap, the nineteen articles and one
edited volume produced under the auspices of this National Science
Foundation (NSF) project can be categorized as addressing uncertainty,19
19. Adam M. Finkel, Emitting More Light than Heat: Lessons from Risk Assessment Contro-
versies for the ‘Job-Killing Regulations’ Debate, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 128 (Cary Cog-
lianese, Adam M. Finkel, & Chris Carrigan eds., 2014); Finkel, I Thought You’d Never Ask,
supra note 10; Adam M. Finkel, Harvesting the Ripe Fruit: Why Is it so Hard to Be Well-
Informed at the Moment of Decision?, in THE VALUE OF INFORMATION: METHODOLOGICAL FRONTIERS
AND NEW APPLICATIONS (Molly Macauley & Ramanan Laxminarayan eds., 2011); Jack Siegrist,
Mixing Good Data with Bad: How to Do It and When You Should Not, in VULNERABILITY, UNCER-
TAINTY, AND RISK: ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND MANAGEMENT 368 (Int’l Conference on Vulnerabil-
ity and Risk Analysis and Mgmt., Bilal M. Ayyub ed., 2011), available at http://ascelibrary
.org/doi/abs/10.1061/41170%28400%2945; Scott Ferson & Jack Siegrist, Statistical Inference
Under Two Structurally Different Approaches to Interval Data, in VULNERABILITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND
RISK: ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND MANAGEMENT, 368 (Int’l Conference on Vulnerability and Risk
Analysis and Mgmt., Bilal M. Ayyub ed., 2011), available at http://cedb.asce.org/cgi/WWW-
display.cgi?274101; Sandra Hoffmann, Overcoming Barriers to Integrating Economic Analysis
into Risk Assessment, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 1345 (2011); Jack Siegrist, Scott Ferson & Adam M.
Finkel, Ravnoprochnost: Avoiding Unnecessary Uncertainty in Cost–Benefit Calculations
(2013) (unpublished manuscript); Jack Siegrist, Scott Ferson & Adam M. Finkel, Advanced
Bias Correction: Factoring Out Misestimation and Overconfidence (2013) (unpublished
manuscript); Scott Ferson et al., Natural Language of Uncertainty: Numeric Hedge Words
(2015) (forthcoming Int’l Journal of Approximate Reasoning); Dale B. Hattis & Adam M.
Finkel, Barriers to a More Even-Handed Treatment of Uncertainties in Projected Economic
Costs and Health Benefits of Environmental Regulations (2013) (unpublished manuscript).
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variability,20 utility,21 or equity.22
III. WHY IS COMPLEXITY VALUABLE?
In Part IV infra, I argue that analytic imbalance—substantially more
complexity or rigor in some large portions of the CBA than in other por-
tions, particularly when risks are analyzed with rigor and costs are not—
creates unstable situations with undesirable consequences. There are, of
course, two basic ways to resolve such an imbalance: add complexity and
rigor to the weak link(s), or discard the extra complexity that encumbers the
more detailed portions of the analysis. So, why might it be preferable to
impel the production of more complex information about risks or costs,
rather than to truncate or produce a “least common denominator” analysis?
If we were contemplating gathering more information to enrich the
analysis, it might be easier to think logically about the pros and cons. The
quantitative treatment of the value of information (VOI) has a well-devel-
oped body of literature supporting it,23 and is founded on the premise that,
although new information can be costly to obtain and can erode net benefits
through delay, its value comes from its ability to reduce the probability or
the magnitude of decision errors.24 In this Article, I am referring not to new
information, but to the complexity with which we can choose to describe
20. Victoria Salin, Variability in the Impact on Industry of Food Safety Regulation: A Review
of Ex Post Analyses, Agribusiness, Food, and Consumer Economics Research Center Com-
modity Market Research Report No. CM-03-12 (March 2012); Winston Harrington, Elena
Safirova, Conrad Coleman, Sébastien Houde, & Adam M. Finkel, Distributional Conse-
quences of Public Policies: An Example from the Management of Urban Vehicular Travel,
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository (2014) (unpublished manuscript); Victoria Salin &
Adam M. Finkel, Variability in Costs to Comply with Regulations: An Application to Food
Safety (2013) (unpublished manuscript).
21. DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, & Chris Carrigan
eds., 2013); Adam M. Finkel, Perceiving Others’ Perceptions of Risk - Still a Task for Sisyphus,
1128 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. (2008); STRATEGIES FOR RISK COMMUNICATION: EVOLUTION, EVI-
DENCE, EXPERIENCE 121 (2008); Branden B. Johnson & Adam M. Finkel, Public Perceptions
of Regulatory Costs, Their Uncertainty, and Their Distribution (2014) (in review, RISK
ANALYSIS); Adam M. Finkel & Branden B. Johnson, A “Top-Down” Elicitation of the Value
of a Statistical Life: Results from a New Stated-Preference Survey (2013) (unpublished
manuscript).
22. See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel, Solution-Focused Risk Assessment: A Proposal for the Fusion
of Environmental Analysis and Action, 17 HUM . & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 75 (2011); Pub-
lic Perceptions of Regulatory Costs, supra note 21; Cranor & Finkel, supra note 18.
23. See, e.g., Fumie Yokota & Kimberly M. Thompson, The Value of Information in Envi-
ronmental Health Risk Management Decisions: Past, Present, Future, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 635
(2004); Finkel, Harvesting the Ripe Fruit, supra note 19.
24. Adam M. Finkel & John S. Evans, Evaluating the Benefits of Uncertainty Reduction in
Environmental Health Risk Management, 37 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 1164, 1165-67
(1987).
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information we already have in hand about risks and costs. It is tempting to
resort to platitudes such as “details matter” or “one size doesn’t fit all,” but
these are unsatisfying in light of the real potential for complexity to delay
the completion of analysis, add costs, and foment public confusion.
So, in order to support the argument that complexity and rigor are
desirable commodities (and therefore to advance the premise that, faced
with an imbalance, we should first consider adding rigor where it is lacking
rather than discarding it where it is present), I rely on an image of a “virtu-
ous circle” of interaction between analysts (who can supply rigor) and deci-
sionmakers (who can demand it). In a companion paper to this one, I
constructed a hierarchy of complexity in cost-benefit decisionmaking con-
sisting of ten distinct levels of detail.25 The hierarchy depicts how informa-
tion can be marshaled to gauge the harms caused by environmental, health,
or safety hazards, as well as the pros and cons of actions to reduce them.
Table 2 shows these levels as a series of equations in several variables; the
companion paper goes into much more detail about the attributes of each
level, and gives examples of contemporary decisions that resemble various
rungs on this ladder of complexity.
The following summary discussion is intended to highlight the ex-
tremes and midpoint of this ladder: (1) the least complex decision rule I can
imagine in this arena is to fixate exclusively on either a potential harm that
society could eliminate, or on the potential costs of eliminating it, and in-
voke the precautionary impulse—if the harm or the cost might exist, treat it
as if it does exist and must be avoided above all else; (2) just above the
middle of the ladder (at Level 6) sits a cost-benefit decision rule that re-
quires information about the probability density function (pdf) for total
cost and total benefit, thereby allowing society to choose a control strategy
that maximizes net benefit (monetized risk-reducing benefits less the cost of
obtaining them) but that can consider different balances between underesti-
mating and overestimating the virtues of each strategy; and (3) at the top of
the ladder sits a decision rule that takes seriously not only uncertainty, but
interindividual variability in both risk and cost, heterogeneity in individual
preferences for changes in longevity or environmental quality and for
changes in personal income, and a social welfare function that accounts for
other attributes of those individuals who receive risk-reducing benefits and
those who pay for those benefits (notably, their income and their baseline
risk levels).
The point of a “virtuous circle” is conceptually simple: complexity helps
decisionmakers see more clearly the true spectrum of available choices and
25. Finkel, I Thought You’d Never Ask, supra note 10.
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TABLE 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF A TEN-RUNG LADDER OF
COMPLEXITY IN REGULATORY DECISION-RULES
Level Verbal Description Symbolic Description       
1 
Prevent or eliminate the most 
dire outcome 
NB > 0 if R > 0 OR if C > 0 
2 Attain a “bright line” of safety NB>0 if R<R* 
3 Pass a “double bright line” test NB>0 if R<R* and C<C* 
4 
Compare arbitrary point 
estimates of total benef it and 
total cost  
5 
Compare reconciled point 
estimates of total benef it and 




Develop a probability density 
function (pdf) for net benef it  
7 
Develop a pdf for net risk 
minus net cost  
8 
Compare pdfs of net risk and 
net cost with some attention to 




Assess the uncertain net benef it 
to each individual (or 




Combine estimates of individual 
net benef it via any non-trivial 
social welfare function 
 
Key to Abbreviations: 
NB = Net Bene  
P = number of persons in affected population 
VSL = Value of a Statistical Life 
R ( C) = change in total risk (total cost) that a policy impels 
r ( c) = change in risk (cost) for a particular individual 
 
Note: this table is greatly elaborated upon, with columns explaining the information needs at each level, 
in Finkel, supra note 10. 
how each choice affects things we hold most dear. Monomaniacal precaution
tends to lead to costly programs to reduce small or non-existent risks, or to
policies of inaction that cater exclusively to the economic interests of a fa-
vored few.26 Keeping an eye only on total costs and benefits, and the uncer-
tainties therein, tends to attenuate these extreme mistakes, but ignores
26. See Peter Montague, Two Friends Debate Risk Assessment and Precaution, RACHEL’S
DEMOCRACY & HEALTH NEWS, Aug. 13, 2007.
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completely the dimension of individual cost and benefit, and thereby courts
outcomes in which net benefit increases marginally but to the detriment of
the majority of those affected.27
In a “vicious circle” of interaction, analysts could fail to describe costs or
benefits with much complexity (and decisionmakers could passively accept
what they are given), or decisionmakers could ask only for simplistic infor-
mation. On the other hand, the decisionmaker could say to the analysts, “I
want to know about uncertainty, the range and distribution of consequences
to individuals, and the net risk reduction considering substitution effects or
the net cost considering general-equilibrium effects.” Similarly, “I think you
need to know about . . .” is something the analysts could say to challenge
the decisionmaker.28 In the companion paper mentioned supra, I argue that
mediocre ambitions for the kind of decisions we wish to make beget mediocre infor-
mation, which in turn begets mediocre decisions. Conversely, I believe that if
decisionmakers demand complexity, or if analysts proffer it with enthusi-
asm, we can master the difficult cost-benefit choices and not simply be car-
ried along in their wake. To the extent that more complex decision rules
yield better results, the unimproved weak links—where we are forced to
discard some scientific or economic information to reach the lower common
denominator of the two—become a proper, and indeed a compelling, subject
of scrutiny.
IV. WHY IS “BALANCE” IMPORTANT?
Whether the analysis considers uncertainty, interindividual variability,
non-linearities in valuation, or equity and social welfare, a common thread
emerges: there is virtue in treating each phenomenon in a balanced way
across the risk/cost divide. The two “sides” are mirror images of each other:
from the point of view of decisionmakers, the only reason to take action is
because of risk, and the only reason not to take action is because of cost. In another
companion piece in the series, we examined quantitatively the disadvan-
tages of an unbalanced treatment of uncertainty or variability in risk versus
27. See Winston Harrington et al., Distributional Consequences of Public Policies: An Ex-
ample from the Management of Urban Vehicular Travel, U OF PENN. INST. FOR LAW & ECON,
Research Paper No. 14-21 (2014).
28. In this discussion, I am presuming that added complexity is sincere, and not con-
cocted to impress stakeholders or judges. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advo-
cacy Dressed Up As Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 56, 60 (Winston
Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling, & Richard D. Morgenstern, eds., 2009). Wagner points out
helpfully that uncertainty analyses can sometimes be drummed up strategically to “prove”
that benefits exceed costs no matter how pessimistic the assumptions used. It is important,
however, to realize that even in such cases, this is not a drawback of uncertainty analysis per
se, but of post hoc and self-serving uncertainty analysis.
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cost.29 Here, I will briefly summarize some of the qualitative principles that
make balance a virtue.
First, the very concept of net benefit depends equally on benefit—i.e.,
risk reduction—and cost: that’s what makes it “net.” Of course, any one of
the phenomena could apply more significantly to benefit than to cost—ben-
efit may be more uncertain than cost, more variable, or better described
with a non-linear valuation or social welfare function—but that would be an
important special case, not the general one. More importantly, there is a
paradox at work here: only through at least trying to address the phenome-
non on both “sides” can we determine that the further pursuit of balance is
not necessary! If uncertainty in cost is indeed small relative to uncertainty
in benefit, that conclusion will arise out of some attempt to quantify uncer-
tainty, or else it will be a rationalization of dubious provenance. Ignoring
something important is a fundamental analytic error, and as a first princi-
ple, errors in risk are no more or less harmful than are errors in cost.
Second, imbalance creates, by definition, an instability: will we proceed
to strengthen the weak link or not? As we explore in our piece regarding the
Russian engineering principle of ravnoprochnost (“equi-sturdiness”) as it ap-
plies to CBA,30 the problem with the weak link in a designed product is not
simply the creation of a vulnerability at which the entire product is most
likely to fail catastrophically; less well-appreciated is the fact that, in hind-
sight, all of the time and expense spent on refining the stronger links be-
yond the quality of the weakest one were wasted. Until the imbalance is
corrected by strengthening the weaker link, decisionmakers really only have
two choices. As mentioned above, one option is to essentially discard much
of the rigor previously gained in the stronger links, and choose a decision
rule that corresponds to the least common denominator of the various in-
puts. For example, decisionmakers could pay no attention to the value of
net benefit for any individual, because there is no information on individual
cost (even though there may be a very detailed analysis of interindividual
variability in risk and benefit). The other possibility is to act as if balance
has been achieved, essentially concocting a false sense of confidence out of a
half-baked analysis. This is perhaps easiest to see when uncertainty is the
analytic phenomenon of interest: the temptation to not “waste” a complete
uncertainty analysis of part of a problem may lead decisionmaker to act as if
the partial uncertainty actually studied is the total uncertainty in the entire
29. Siegrist et al., Ravnoprochnost, supra note 19.
30. Id.
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problem.31 This kind of underestimation of uncertainty is a serious pitfall,
as the next sections will demonstrate.
V. WHY IS UNCERTAINTY IMPORTANT?
I now turn to the first and arguably most far-reaching of the four ways
in which benefit and cost estimation can differ—the honesty with which
uncertainty is explored and communicated. A vast and growing literature,
initiated more than one hundred years ago but especially active during the
1980s and 1990s, attests to the intensity with which scholars and practition-
ers have explored the sources of uncertainty in quantitative policy analysis,
and explains how inattention to uncertainty can frustrate sound decision-
making.32 All these discussions emphasize somewhat different features of
the basic question “how can overconfidence poison decisionmaking?”33
Here, with an appreciation of the details and alternative perspectives such a
summary must omit, I attempt a very basic synthesis of how I have an-
swered this question.
All of the important deficiencies of using a point estimate instead of a
depiction that acknowledges the uncertainty of a quantity—in this context,
risk, cost, or net benefit—fall into one or more of three overarching lapses:
31. It may also lead critics of a regulation to complain about an analysis as if the partial
uncertainty actually studied is the only source of poor uncertainty analysis in the regula-
tion—and so one secondary advantage of balanced treatment of uncertainty in risk and cost is
that it helps “spread the targets” and reduce the paradoxical situation where the strongest
portion of the analysis receives the most criticism and hence the most additional refinement.
32. Among the most comprehensive book-length references specific to uncertainty in
risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are: M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCER-
TAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS
(1992); ADAM M. FINKEL, CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY IN RISK MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR DECI-
SION-MAKERS (1990); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
(1994); ALISON CULLEN & H. CHRISTOPHER FREY, PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUES IN EXPOSURE ASSESS-
MENT: A HANDBOOK FOR DEALING WITH VARIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN MODELS AND INPUTS
(1999); ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., NOT A SURE THING: MAKING REGULATORY CHOICES UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY (2009); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBA-
BLE (2010). But of course there are many others, and still more references from outside the
fields of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis that have much to impart.
33. Less commonly explored, because it is less common a pitfall, is “underconfidence”—
the conclusion that uncertainty is so large that nothing meaningful can be said or done.
Sometimes a dauntingly broad range can emerge from a very rigorous analysis that pays
special attention to one or both tails of the distribution, but often underconfidence, like
overconfidence, can emerge instead from the most cursory or automatic of processes. Con-
cern has been raised, for example, about the corrosive effect of EPA’s boilerplate statement
of underconfidence about carcinogenic potency—the agency routinely caveats its point esti-
mate of potency with the clause “but it could be as low as zero” even in cases where theory
and evidence makes it extremely unlikely that the substance has zero potency. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 104 (2009).
Fall 2014] The Cost of Nothing Trumps the Value of Everything 107
(1) incorrectly assuming that a particular value for the quantity is, in fact,
the “desired estimator” when that value and the estimator actually diverge
from each other; (2) choosing a correct value of one particular estimator,
when a different estimator would better serve the decision; or (3) failing to
discern that no single estimator can optimize the decision, nor can it ade-
quately communicate the reality of the situation to affected parties.
To see these three problems in their full light requires one to think
about the reasons why we use estimators, and the notion that an estimator
can become what I would clumsily term an “estimanacle.” In his poem
“London,” William Blake wrote about “the mind-forg’ed manacles” we use
to chain others and ourselves.34 I start from the premise that, given a distri-
bution of the true values of some quantity, any estimator can do no more
than help the decisionmaker balance the adverse consequences of error, ac-
cording to the exact and particular way that estimator strikes that balance. If
the adverse consequences when the quantity turns out to be smaller than
you estimate it to be are exactly as adverse as they are if the quantity turns
out to be larger than you estimate it to be, then the median of the uncer-
tainty distribution could well be the best possible estimator to use. Half of
the time (with half of the probability), we would have to live with the
consequences of one type of error, and half of the time with the other. Any
estimator other than the median would strike a different balance, but in this
hypothetical case we have already said that such a balance would not reflect
this decisionmaker’s true preferences as well as the median would.
The great value of a point estimate is that it can make sense of a distri-
bution when the consequences of error are known and agreed upon. The
estimator is a necessary manacle, because it forces us (indeed, allows us) to
decide based on a particular set of preferences (one can’t be risk-averse and
risk-seeking at the same time, for the same decision). But we can be led to
paradise or to perdition, depending on whether the estimator is what we are told it
is, and on whether it imposes upon us those preferences we would consciously choose
ourselves.
The first problem amounts to unacknowledged and uncorrected bias: a
good decision could have been made with an accurate depiction of a particu-
lar estimator, but inattention to uncertainty resulted in garden-variety mis-
estimation. Suppose, for example, that the analyst and decisionmaker agree
that they are interested in the expected value or mean, a quantity that has
strong and broad appeal.35 It is easy to imagine arriving at a grossly errone-
ous estimate of the mean of some quantity when it is modeled as the sum or
34. WILLIAM BLAKE, London, in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1794).
35. See Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Con-
servative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 13.
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product of several uncertain components—the short-cut of combining esti-
mates of each mean value may bear little resemblance to the overall mean if
one or more components are omitted, or if the components do not combine
in the way that the model predicts.
Less well-understood, but potentially far more important, is the fact
that even random sampling from existing data (as opposed to estimation via
modeling) may not yield a precise or even an unbiased estimate of the
mean.36 More generally, the distribution of uncertainty in the mean derived
via sampling from an asymmetric distribution is itself asymmetric.37 This
has profound implications for analysis and management. Expected-value
decisionmaking is supposed to be a way to bypass uncertainty—proponents
say it shouldn’t matter whether the distribution is broad or narrow when
you know how it behaves on average.38 But if you need to study the uncer-
tainty in order to estimate the mean properly, this short-cut becomes an excur-
sion straight into a minefield. When the tails determine the mean, there is no
substitute for studying the tails directly, at which point the “short-cut” has become
moot.39
The second problem exposes the weaknesses of expected-value, or any
other one-size-fits-all prescription for social decisionmaking. In my experi-
ence, many advocates of expected-value decisionmaking are oblivious, will-
fully or otherwise, to the powerful value judgments it imposes upon society.
At the same time, advocates of decision rules whose ethical underpinnings
are more blatant tend to dismiss other equally valid judgments that could be
made. Elementary decision theory teaches that any estimator (for purposes
of this discussion, think of “estimator” as “percentile point on an uncertainty
distribution”) will be optimal for one particular relationship between the
36. See the discussion of “Level 5” in the analytic hierarchy developed in Finkel, I
Thought You’d Never Ask, supra note 10.
37. See Adam M. Finkel, A Simple Formula for Calculating the “Mass Density” of a
Lognormally-Distributed Characteristic: Applications to Risk Analysis, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 2291
(1990).
38. See, e.g., Ralph M. Perhac, Jr., Does Risk Assessment Make a Case for Conservatism?, 7
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENV’T 297, 302 (1996).
39. Although for clarity this example uses variability rather than uncertainty as the
source of incertitude, the importance of non-normal populations should be easy to discern.
Suppose you need an unbiased estimate of the mean income of the U.S. population. If one in
every 10,000 Americans was a billionaire, the average wealth even of a “large” sample of
10,000 could quite possibly be an underestimate (in the common case [its probability ap-
proaches 1/e, or 37%] where no billionaires were randomly selected among the first 10,000),
but could be a gross overestimate (in the less common case where two billionaires, rather
than the expected number of one, were picked).
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consequences of underestimation and those of overestimation.40 The mean
minimizes the expected amount of deviation between the actual value of the
uncertain quantity and the value (the estimator) we use as if it applies,
without regard to the sign of the error. This is why I have often used the
parable that, faced with an uncertain distribution of travel times to get to an
airport to catch a plane, the expected value is ideal for someone who would
prefer being four minutes late to being five minutes early (!), but deeply
misleading to anyone who has any other calculus in mind.41 A particular
percentile estimator other than the median may be the only ideal choice for
any decision where the consequences of one type of error exceed the other;
these sorts of “precautionary” (in either direction) estimators force the par-
ties to confront their values (which may not lead to harmony), whereas
expected-value estimators tend to impose the constraint of equal weighting
of outcomes upon the users. I think we would never consider an analysis
successful if it didn’t provide an answer to the question being asked, but
that is quintessentially what a point estimate does: it is a guide to one way
of deciding, which may not be the way that all or any of the decisionmakers
actually prefer. Only the uncertainty gives possible access to the estimator
that is right for the person(s) using the estimate.
The third way in which a point estimate tends to thwart sensible regula-
tory decisionmaking is more difficult to explain, but involves the inherent
limitations of reducing uncertain possibilities to any single value. Although
it may be a superhuman feat to map a distribution of possibilities onto a
binary or finite set of choices, sometimes no one estimator—even one con-
sciously chosen to reflect the decisionmaker’s attitude towards errors of
under- and over-estimation—can tell the whole story of what we are actually
gambling with. A particular decision may be preferable to another because
it is far superior if net benefit turns out to be at its expected value, clearly
better if net benefit turns out to be much greater than average, and only
slightly worse if net benefit turns out to be much lower than average. Need-
less to say, no single point estimate can show how difficult this choice truly
is, and also how robust a particular decision might be when one considers
the true spectrum of uncertainty.42
40. Kimberly M. Thompson and John D. Graham, Going Beyond the Single Number:
Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Improve Risk Management, 2 HUM . ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 1008 (1996).
41. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 335-40 (1995).
42. When the pivotal quantity exhibits interindividual variability rather than uncer-
tainty, looking at the whole distribution can reveal creative and superior disaggregation, via
multiple simultaneous decisions. For example, given how the health benefits of ingesting
Omega-3 fatty acids change with age and sex, and how the risks of ingesting mercury also do
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Therefore, the specific folly of marrying a pdf for risk to a point estimate
for cost is overwhelming.43 Not only is this practice guaranteed to underes-
timate the actual uncertainty in net benefit, but:
• with this combination, one can’t reliably even estimate expected
net benefit;
• even with good luck and a reliable estimate of expected net bene-
fit, that output is ample only in an impoverished decision context
(risk-neutrality with respect to the magnitude of net benefit); and
• because the uncertainty that is acknowledged is one-sided (i.e., it
contains no information about uncertainty in cost), the normal
rules of value-of-information theory are out the window: one
can’t even begin to think systematically about whether more in-
formation on cost would improve the decision.
Not everyone agrees that more information about uncertainty is salu-
tary, I hasten to add.44 Of course uncertainty analyses cost money and take
time, and should only be refined consistent with the value they have in light
of their costs—that is, if the refinement could reduce the expected opportu-
nity loss (i.e., regret) of the decision by an amount greater than the cost of
the refinement.45 Some observers fear that more information about uncer-
tainty can confuse decisionmakers and the public, can falsely imply that all
values within a range are equally likely, or can politicize decisions (i.e., by
encouraging the “look at the tail but don’t divulge how far out it goes”
strategy of insulating decisions from public pressure).46 Although the sec-
ond of these concerns can easily be handled by explaining that this is not
usually how one interprets a range,47 I sympathize with these concerns.
(in different ways), agencies could set (say) six different guideline levels for how much fish
of which varieties are safe to consume, each applying to males or females in three broad age
categories (child, adult, elderly). Here the decision-maker is not balancing different kinds of
errors, but minimizing all of them by increasing (here, “individualizing”) the number of
interventions.
43. See Siegrist et al., Ravnoprochnost, supra note 19.
44. PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
(PCCRAM): RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING
(1997), at 89-90 (finding that mathematical assessments of uncertainty are not always helpful
when “risk-related decisions are routine, made at the local level, and do not involve large
stakes”); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 33, at 103-04 (dis-
cussing EPA’s approach to deciding how much uncertainty analysis to deploy).
45. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 33, at 82-87; Finkel,
Harvesting the Ripe Fruit, supra note 19.
46. PCCRAM, supra note 44, at 171.
47. M. GRANGER MORGAN ET AL., BEST PRACTICE APPROACHES FOR CHARACTERIZING, COMMU-
NICATING, AND INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN CLIMATE DECISION MAKING 20 (Nat’l
Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. ed., 2009).
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However, I believe that the human and financial costs of misestimation and
decisions that backfire are far larger than the costs of “too much informa-
tion.” Although their article (like so many others to be discussed infra) dealt
only with uncertainty in risk and ignored uncertainty in cost, no one has
ever said it better than Wilson, Crouch, and Zeise: “a decision made with-
out taking uncertainty into account is barely worth calling a decision.”48
VI. WHICH IS LARGER: RISK UNCERTAINTY OR
COST UNCERTAINTY?
Before proceeding to examine in detail the treatment of uncertainty
across the risk/cost divide, we need to confront honestly a precondition for
uncertainty analysis—where there is little or no uncertainty, there is little or
no need to quantify or communicate it. This is a limiting case of the more
general issue of symmetry; if risks are far more uncertain than costs, more
attention to risk uncertainty relative to cost uncertainty may actually be the
proper response to the raw materials—a “feature rather than a bug.” Al-
though I will explore many other reasons for treating the two kinds of un-
certainty differently, the relative size of the two is so fundamental to their
treatment that it must be dealt with at the outset.
Unfortunately, “how uncertain are risks (or costs)?” is a very hard ques-
tion to answer, in large part because of the inherent Catch-22—estimates of
uncertainty may be a terrible guide to how uncertain the observer actually
is. This is especially so when the person(s) doing the estimating have an
incentive to appear more confident than they have a right to be. In any
event, there are very few examples of a priori estimates of uncertainty to
compare on both sides of any particular risk/cost problem, simply because
there are so few rigorous attempts to quantify cost uncertainty. We can,
however, exploit two other kinds of information to explore the possibility
that costs are better understood (i.e., less uncertain) than risks are: data on
the uncertainty in various components of risk or cost, and specific instances
of surprise or corroboration when we have been able to measure either risk
or cost ex post and compare it to predicted values.
Both kinds of information need to fit into a coherent template that
defines and circumscribes uncertainty. As a working definition that facili-
tates a fair comparison, I suggest the following four principles:
• For this narrow purpose, we should be interested in estimates of popula-
tion risk and total cost, as opposed to estimates of risk or cost for identi-
fied or hypothetical individuals. Misestimation of risk or cost
48. Richard Wilson et al., Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, in RISK QUANTITATION AND REG-
ULATORY POLICY 133, 133 (David G. Hoel et al. eds., 1985).
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because of inattention to variability (or mistakes in ascribing vari-
ability) is important in its own right, but focusing on population
measures isolates the performance of the uncertainty analysis.
Furthermore, individual risk can, by definition, never be proven
or disproven. If, say, one million people each face a predicted risk
of approximately 1 in 1000, and we say that uncertainty means
that somewhere between 900 and 1100 people are predicted to
succumb to the risk, then the discovery that 100, or 1900, people
actually succumbed would reveal overconfidence. On the other
hand, an estimate of a “reasonable worst-case” risk of 1 in 100 for
certain highly exposed people can neither be corroborated nor
refuted by the death of any particular person—by chance, any per-
son could either succumb or not, at any true probability.
• We should measure uncertainty, bias, or surprise in multiplicative rather
than additive terms. Measures like the coefficient of variation, the
ratio of predicted to observed values, or the ratio of the 95th and
5th percentiles of a set of estimates are scale-invariant, which
makes them preferable to absolute measures for comparing differ-
ent sets of results.
• We should compare results so as to either include or ignore model uncer-
tainty, rather than mixing different types of results. Both risk esti-
mates and cost estimates are complicated by parameter
uncertainty and model uncertainty. For example, consider the de-
cision of whether to require firms to install pollution control de-
vices to reduce emissions of a substance found to cause cancer in
rodents. The uncertainty in the number of “lives saved” by the
devices is a function of uncertainty in numerous parameters, in-
cluding binomial sampling uncertainty in the rodent dose-re-
sponse experiments, imprecision in the value of the exponent
used to scale by allometry from rodents to humans, inability to
precisely specify the capture efficiency of the devices, etc. Here
the parameters are not known precisely, but we can choose to
assume that the equation we use to model their relationship to
risk [that is, lives saved equals (fraction of emissions reduced) x
(potency in rodents) x (rodent:human scaling factor) x (number
of exposed persons)] is known to be correct. On the cost side, we
could assume that a different simple linear equation applies: cost
equals [(the current price of one device) x (total number of de-
vices installed to comply with the regulation) x (factor by which
current price will drop due to economies of scale and/or techno-
logical learning)]. As in the “risk equation,” each parameter can
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be assigned an uncertainty, and the uncertainty in cost is esti-
mated as the convolution of these distributions. But for both risk
and cost, the models themselves may be incorrect. For example,
there may be a significant probability, according to expert judg-
ment, that the rodent carcinogen acts via a mechanism that is
irrelevant to or inoperative in humans. The uncertainty distribu-
tion for the risk can thus either be expressed as the previous pa-
rameter-uncertainty distribution (under the “default” model), as
the degenerate distribution (probably a point estimate at zero)
under the alternative assumption, as a weighted combination of
the two distributions, informed by expert elicitation,49 or as two
or more separate distributions with a narrative explanation of the
ambiguity and of the weights that could be assigned to each.50
The cost model might also be incorrect; according to the “Porter
Hypothesis,” for example, considering only the firm’s outlays for
pollution-control devices neglects the consequent savings in
materials, labor, and production efficiency these devices often
create, resulting in cost over-estimation of substantial and uncer-
tain magnitude.51 Although there exists a spectrum of views on
whether and how to account for model uncertainty,52 any com-
parison of uncertainty in risk and cost needs to take care not to
treat model uncertainty differently within the same analysis. Of
course one side of the ledger will look more uncertain than the
other if its distribution incorporates the additional ambiguity
contributed by multiple model assumptions, but capturing all un-
certainties is, in my opinion, less important than accounting for
and comparing uncertainty in a systematic and symmetric way.
• We should strive to assess net risk and net cost—rather than putting to
the side the direct trade-offs that accompany risks and costs—but, in
any event, we should assess net effects on both sides or neither,
not one without the other. There is a compelling but largely un-
recognized parallel between risk assessment and cost assessment:
49. UNCERTAINTY MODELING IN DOSE RESPONSE: BENCH TESTING ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICITY
177 (Roger Cooke ed., 2009).
50. For a discussion of the pros and cons of each approach to model uncertainty, see
Chapter 8 of Science and Judgment, supra note 32, at 144-159, and Chapter 4 of Science and
Decisions, supra note 33, at 93-126.
51. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environ-
ment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1995); contra Karen Palmer et al.,
Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?, 9 J. ECON.
PERSP. 119 (1995).
52. See Uncertainty Modeling in Dose Response, supra note 49, at 1.
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in both arenas, countervailing effects of policy interventions can
diminish, offset, or even exceed the direct effects.53 The subfield
of “risk vs. risk”54 challenges conventional or myopic assessment
to admit that reducing one risk can often create, increase, or con-
centrate some other risk (see Figure 1 for my adaptation of Gra-
ham and Wiener’s influential 2x2 typology of risk-risk tradeoffs).
But at the same time, a powerful set of “cost versus cost” trade-offs
perturbs the economics of regulation55—and we should see these ef-
fects as wholly analogous to the indirect-risk issues. Economists
know this as the distinction between the simplistic analysis of
compliance costs to the directly regulated firms, which they call
“partial equilibrium,” and the more complete analysis of these
plus the other changes in prices charged, quantities demanded,
labor employed, and capital amassed as the direct result of the
compliance changes, which they call “general equilibrium.”56
Viewed as a conceptual oversimplification, the failure to consider
the economic benefits of regulation is exactly parallel to the fail-
ure to consider the health harms of risk reduction.
FIGURE 1. GRAHAM-WIENER TYPOLOGY WITH EXAMPLES
Risk 
Same Type Different Type 
Risk Offset Risk Substitution 
Stronger car roofs  
(reduced severity, increase (?) 
probability of a rollover) 
Chlorination/cholera 
Risk Transfer Risk Transformation 




53. See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel, Emitting More Light than Heat, supra note 19, at 131-32.
54. E.g., RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 16; Samuel Rascoff & Richard Revesz, The Biases
of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
55. See generally Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental
Quality Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990).
56. Id. at 855.
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A. Estimates of Risk Uncertainty
Although a meta-analysis of the existing fragments of information rele-
vant to quantifying the typical extent of risk uncertainty is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is clear that uncertainty abounds in risk science.57
The nature of risk estimates makes it unusual to be able to contrast pre-
dicted with observed human health outcomes. On the other hand, the un-
certainty in some components of risk assessment can be estimated.
Parameter uncertainty in population dose-response estimation, a key ele-
ment in human health risk assessment, is amenable to some quantification.
Perhaps the most informative such study was conducted more than twenty-
five years ago by Allen et al., who estimated for various carcinogenic sub-
stances the potency uncertainties due to the imprecision either inherent in
epidemiologic studies or toxicologic experiments.58 Their study also shed
further light on the accuracy of both methods by comparing the two differ-
ent kinds of predictions for each substance to one another, for the twenty-
three cases where evidence from both humans and laboratory animals exists
to conduct the comparison.59 Figure 2 (reproduced from Allen et al.60)
shows that the 90th percentile confidence intervals for the potencies derived
from epidemiology—the vertical error bars—range from about one order of
magnitude to six or seven orders of magnitude. The confidence intervals
from toxicology—the horizontal error bars—are generally somewhat nar-
rower, but one or two of them also span nearly five orders of magnitude. In
the same figure, the distance from the intersection point of each pair of
error bars to the dashed, forty-five-degree line is a measure of the additional
uncertainty contributed by the inability of investigations on one species
(human or rodent) to predict the potency in the other species. This rodent-
human uncertainty (notwithstanding decades of complaints about the folly
of rodent toxicology, as in Whelan61) actually happens to be quite modest—
perhaps a factor between five and twenty at most, and much less so on
average given the rather remarkable pattern of scatter on both sides of the
forty-five-degree line (the two parallel dashed lines I added to the Allen et
al. diagram represent a rodent:human uncertainty of ten-fold). With this
important set of chemicals as a template, the uncertainty in the potency of a
57. See supra note 32.
58. Bruce C. Allen et al., Correlation between Carcinogenic Potency of Chemicals in Ani-
mals and Humans, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 531 (1988).
59. Id. By definition, this meta-analysis could not assess the model uncertainty due to
the possible human irrelevance of rodent carcinogenicity findings, since it considered only
substances with positive results in both rodents and humans.
60. Allen et al., supra note 58, at 539.
61. Elizabeth M. Whelan, Stop Banning Products at the Drop of a Rat, INSIGHT, Dec. 1994,
at 18.
116 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:1
new substance assessed either by epidemiology or toxicology might be ap-
proximated as roughly a factor of the geometric mean of (depending) the
widths of the vertical or horizontal error bars, inflated further by a rough
estimate of the uncertainty in the interspecies comparison.62
FIGURE 2. CENTRAL ESTIMATES AND UNCERTAINTY RANGES FOR
CARCINOGENIC POTENCY OF THE TWENTY-THREE
SUBSTANCES WHERE HUMAN AND ANIMAL
ESTIMATES ARE BOTH AVAILABLE
 
 
Note: The original f igure f irst appeared in Allen et. al, supra note 58, at 539.  The adapted version 
depicted here f irst appeared in Adam M. Finkel, EPA Underestimates, Oversimplifies, Miscommunicates, 
and Mismanages Cancer Risks by Ignoring Human Susceptibility,  34 RISK ANALYSIS 1785, 1789 (2014).  The 
author thanks Allen et al. and the journal RISK ANALYSIS for allowing its reproduction here. 
 
For clarity, the labels naming each substance have been removed; for example, the substance in the 
lower left corner and far above the 45-degree line is cadmium, for which both the conf idence limits 
from toxicology and from epidemiology are rather small. 
Much of this uncertainty presumably stems from the rather small sam-
ple sizes in epidemiologic studies of chemical carcinogens, and from the
62. If the underlying distributions from which these confidence intervals come are
lognormal, then the correct way to propagate the two types of uncertainty would be to add
the squares of their logarithmic standard deviations, and take the square root of the sum. For
a lognormal whose 95th percentile is X-fold greater than its 5th percentile, the logarithmic
standard deviation is (ln X/3.29).
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even smaller samples inherent in laboratory bioassays. For a recent example
of a thorough uncertainty analysis in human health that takes advantage of
large human studies (and multiple such investigations), consider the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) report on the benefits of the
1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments.63 That report concluded that for
the year 2020, the 95th percentile estimate of avoided mortality (and to a
much lesser extent, avoided morbidity) benefits from all CAA controls on
fine particulate matter and other criteria air pollutants was $5.7 trillion,
with a lower-bound (5th percentile) estimate of $250 billion.64 This “factor
of twenty-five” uncertainty comes predominantly from uncertainty in the
concentration-response functions for PM2.5 and some of the other pollu-
tants, but also includes a smaller component of uncertainty (roughly a factor
of two) due to the spectrum of reasonable estimates from stated-preference
and revealed-preference studies of the value of a statistical life.
Examples such as these attest to the fact that there is substantial param-
eter uncertainty in risk science, but neither too little uncertainty to be safely
ignored, nor so much uncertainty that we cannot make reasonable risk-based
decisions. Larger, qualitative errors of course also plague risk assessment,
with our evolving understanding of model uncertainty in specific cases sug-
gesting that some prior beliefs were false positives (such as the initial con-
cern that the artificial sweetener saccharin was a human carcinogen65), while
others may have been false negatives (such as the growing concern that non-
ionizing radiation from power transmission lines or cellphones may in fact
be capable of causing adverse health effects66). Even larger errors may occur
in risk assessment, if one accepts the view that small exposures to certain
toxic substances may be beneficial to the health of some individuals,67 and
therefore that an estimate of positive benefit from a particular exposure
reduction may mask a true effect that is actually of the opposite sign. As
mentioned supra, when reducing one risk causes a different risk to increase,
“errors of sign” can also occur. Graham and Wiener’s 1995 book suggests a
dozen or so cases where risk-reduction benefits may have been overstated,
63. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990
TO 2020 (2011).
64. Id. at 7-9, tbl. 7-5.
65. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY
PROGRAM, REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 466-68 (2011).
66. See Press Release, World Health Organization, IARC Classifies Radiofrequency
Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans (May 31, 2011), http://www
.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2011/pdfs/pr208_E.pdf.
67. See Edward J. Calabrese & Linda A. Baldwin, Hormesis: The Dose-Response Revolu-
tion, 43 ANN. REV. OF PHARMACOLOGY AND TOXICOLOGY 175 (2003); but see Kristina Thayer et al.,
Fundamental Flaws of Hormesis for Public Health Decisions, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1271
(2005).
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and in a few of these cases—such as the asbestos remediation example—of
the wrong sign.68 As I will discuss in detail, risk assessors have worked
diligently over the past twenty-five years to continually improve the hon-
esty and transparency with which they strive to incorporate these various
types of uncertainty into their work.
B. Estimates of Cost Uncertainty
The raw material for cost estimation makes this side of the ledger more
amenable than risk assessment is to retrospective evaluation; unlike changes
in longevity, changes in wealth can be measured at the population and indi-
vidual levels, and can often to a large extent be causally attributed to spe-
cific policy actions. There have only been a handful of surveys comparing ex
ante predictions of regulatory cost to realized ex post values, however, and
they reveal substantial uncertainty and potential for surprise. Probably the
most comprehensive of these was a meta-survey conducted by Harrington,
Morgenstern, and Nelson, who looked at twenty-five cases previously gen-
erated from roughly fifteen researchers or committees (notably, the eight
OSHA cases developed by the Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment in 199569).70 They found that the ratio of total predicted costs to total
realized costs ranged from roughly one to one up to roughly twenty to one.
Unlike the case for risk assessment, the concept of false negatives and
positives doesn’t really apply to cost estimation, as zero risk (i.e., is the
substance benign or harmful?) is not paralleled by a dichotomy of “zero
cost” (i.e., does a policy intervention cost nothing or something?) However,
the concept of “super uncertainty” (estimates of the wrong sign, yielding
confidence limits with ratios less than zero), applies equally or more so in
economics as compared to risk science. In some cases, industries have real-
ized savings from regulations that required them to purchase pollution-con-
trol devices that improved production efficiency by more than the
investment cost.71 More generally, a partial-equilibrium analysis of regula-
tory cost can easily conclude that an intervention decreased overall eco-
nomic welfare (that is, before health and environmental benefits are
weighed against this negative change), whereas a general-equilibrium analy-
sis of the same intervention might conclude that the policy increased overall
68. See RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 16, at 16.
69. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ENV-635, GAUGING CON-
TROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: AN APPRAISAL OF
OSHA’S ANALYTIC APPROACH (1995).
70. Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of
Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000).
71. Eban Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overestimating Environmental Costs,
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 64.
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economic welfare, even before considering health and environmental bene-
fits. Very few general-equilibrium analyses exist that consider salutary ef-
fects on unemployed workers—which is probably the most logical way in
which regulatory investments can benefit the overall economy—but that is
not the only way regulatory economists can “get the sign wrong.” Occasion-
ally, market substitution can drive win/win outcomes, as apparently hap-
pened in the wake of the highly publicized withdrawal of the growth
hormone Alar from the U.S. apple crop in 1989. The temporary difficulty
that growers of Red Delicious and McIntosh apples had getting expected
quantities to supermarket shelves the year after the withdrawal created a
vacuum which other apple varieties (such as the Fuji and Gala) rapidly
filled; when one looks at the entire U.S. apple market (rather than only the
subset of growers who bore the costs), average price charged and quantity
demanded both rose significantly in the several years immediately after the
Alar withdrawal, indicating that both consumer and producer welfare
increased.72
So, are costs more uncertain than risks are? Although it seems reasona-
ble to conclude that there may tend to be greater quantitative uncertainties
in risk than in cost, there may be equal or greater potential for qualitative
errors in the sign of the cost estimate. With an eye toward the sources of
uncertainty rather than just the magnitude, there is a fundamental asymme-
try that further mitigates towards greater concern about cost uncertainty:
risks are a characteristic of natural systems, whereas prices are a result of
human interactions in markets. Put another way, risks are elusive, but at
least they are not capable of intentionally changing their size, whereas costs
can increase or decrease strategically and perhaps even in response to being
studied! This extra dimension of game theory makes cost uncertainty more
precarious, and therefore arguably more important to keep an eye on. In any
event, it should be clear from this brief survey of the analytical landscape
that both risk and cost are uncertain enough to merit serious, and roughly
equivalent, efforts directed at understanding and accommodating them. No
evidence to date, in my view, would support the view that cost uncertainty
is so small relative to risk uncertainty that it can be treated casually or
reserved for cases where more rigor “matters” (notwithstanding the illogic
of asserting that one can know when uncertainty “matters,” without already
having estimated how much uncertainty there is).
There is another dimension to the question of relative importance,
though, that tips the scales even further in favor of treating cost uncertainty
with additional rigor and humility. Analysts really should be concerned not
72. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 295, 371 (1995).
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just about which errors can affect predictions, but which errors can affect
decisions. If the common decision criteria are relatively sensitive to errors
of one type and robust to errors of the other, it makes no sense to concen-
trate on uncertainty in the latter type and downplay the former. In regula-
tory arena after arena, costs turn out to matter as much or more than risks do, so
our understanding of costs should at the very least match our understanding of
risks.
This statement is not meant to imply that a “dollar” in monetized risk
reduction is less important, or even treated as less important, than a dollar
of regulatory cost—it suggests only that, at the margin, where real decisions
are constrained, “tipping points” of cost are often reached before tipping
points of risk are. No regulatory arena captures this asymmetry more clearly
than occupational safety and health regulation. Although the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is supposed to (and does) con-
sider both costs and benefits, every health standard in its rulebook has been
set at the point where marginal cost concerns reached a perceived threshold.
The reason why every one of OSHA’s health standards leaves behind a
different level of residual risk73 is that OSHA was unwilling to press for
lowered (or common) risk levels in the face of concern that additional strin-
gency would not be “economically feasible.” For example, OSHA set the
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) for formaldehyde at 0.75 ppm in 1992;74
at that level, OSHA said there was considerable uncertainty about excess
lifetime cancer risk.75 Its cost analysis concluded that the most highly af-
fected industry subsector, plywood manufacture, would face compliance
costs of no more than five percent of its profits to control formaldehyde to
0.75 ppm, making that level economically feasible.76 OSHA concluded,
however, that a PEL of 0.5 ppm was not economically feasible.77 So a po-
tential change in the risk—one that was quite small relative to the assessed
uncertainty in risk—was declared to be prohibitively costly, and yet no un-
certainty analysis in cost was conducted to demonstrate how confident we
should be in that rather emphatic conclusion. If real decisions depend more
73. Adam M. Finkel & P. Barry Ryan, Risk in the Workplace: Where Analysis Began and
Problems Remain Unsolved, in RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 187, 205, tbl. 9.6
(Mark G. Robson & William A. Toscano eds., 2007).
74. Formaldehyde, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (1992).
75. Id. (OSHA’s maximum likelihood estimate was 6x10-6, with a 95th percentile upper
bound of 2.6x10-3.) See also Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290,
22,291-92 (May 27, 1992).
76. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,290, 22,302 (May 27,
1992) (projecting the total annual costs of the rule to be $660,291).
77. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (1992) (setting the PEL at 0.75 ppm, higher than 0.5
ppm).
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critically on when costs become intolerable than on when risks remain intolerable,
nothing is more important analytically than being honest about the uncertainty in
where that tipping point may occur.
VII. GUIDANCE: HOW ARE FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
Supposed TO HANDLE COST UNCERTAINTY?
The enthusiasm with which agencies confront uncertainty in regulatory
cost, especially in contrast to how they handle uncertainty in risk, can best
be gauged in two complementary ways—by examining what they say and
evaluating what they do. The former is the arena of guidance, and the latter
the realm of practice.
Although agency practice is conceptually simple to evaluate, there are
multiple different types and sources of guidance, which I will parse into two
main categories, the first one bifurcated further. The main division sepa-
rates “internal” from “external” guidance, recognizing that an instruction an
agency gives to itself likely reflects more knowledge of (and perhaps more
deference to) institutional constraints than does advice proffered from
outside the regulatory system. Tables 3a and 3b contain a chronological
summary of major guidance statements about uncertainty in risk and cost
produced from within the federal government: the first set of documents is
produced by agencies themselves, and the second is produced by federal
institutions with some responsibility to oversee agency activity (such as
Congress, OIRA, the Supreme Court, and, in one special case, a blue-rib-
bon commission whose members were chosen by both the Clinton Adminis-
tration and by both parties in Congress).78 Table 4 then summarizes advice
about regulatory risk and cost uncertainty initiated outside the federal sys-
tem, generally by individual scholars or groups thereof. Because economists
work on both sides of the benefit/cost firewall (valuing risk reductions as
monetary benefits, and also estimating costs) (see Part I supra), I have added
an additional column to Table 4 to capture how the environmental econom-
ics profession may tend to put a different emphasis on uncertainty in valua-
tion versus uncertainty in cost.
78. PCCRAM, supra note 44.
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TABLE 3A. GUIDANCE FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL AGENCIES ABOUT
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TABLE 3B. GUIDANCE FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE FEDERAL
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TABLE 4. GUIDANCE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMISTS ABOUT
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This nearly thirty-year survey of resolutions and advice about uncer-
tainty supports only one strong conclusion: long after risk uncertainty was
accepted as a phenomenon that should not be swept under the rug, guidance
about cost uncertainty lagged far behind, and indeed only recently began to
catch up to where the rhetorical resolve to confront risk uncertainty was
twenty years ago. Although the recent Institute of Medicine report “Envi-
ronmental Decisions in the Face of Uncertainty” does give passing reference
to cost uncertainty as one of several deficiencies to correct,79 there is still no
“Habicht Memorandum”80 singling out cost uncertainty as a problem the
EPA must confront; no subtitle in a piece of legislation dictating how
agency economists should choose their models and interpret their data; and
no “frontiers of environmental economics”81 research agenda that treats un-
certainty in cost as seriously as it treats controversy in estimates of the
value of a longevity or an ecological benefit. In what may qualify as an
“exception that proves the rule,” the one prominent denunciation of single-
point estimates of cost came from the 1997 Presidential/Congressional com-
mission report.82 However, that document is also a well-known exception in
that it is, at the same time, unenthusiastic about reporting uncertainty in
risk, so perhaps this doubly contradictory pair of recommendations can be
attributed to the “one hand, other hand” vagaries of committee processes
where sign-off is achieved by incorporating multiple viewpoints. In sum-
mary, to the extent that agencies follow their own guidance, or are eager to
come into agreement with advice offered by scholars, those satisfied with
point estimates of regulatory cost have had little to worry about for the past
generation.
VIII. PRACTICE: HOW ARE FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
Actually HANDLING COST UNCERTAINTY?
In order to provide a more complete picture of the past and present
practices regarding uncertainty in regulatory costs at U.S. federal agencies,
I have developed a ten-level scoring system to grade the quality of such
analyses, which I will apply in turn to three different time periods in the
evolution of regulatory analysis. First, I will evaluate an influential EPA
regulation from the 1980s and an important OSHA regulation from the
1990s, to contrast the treatment of risk and cost uncertainty at a time when
79. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY
(2013).
80. Infra note 168.
81. The Frontiers of Environmental Economics, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2007), http://
www.rff.org/rff/Events/Frontiers-of-Environmental-Economics.cfm.
82. PCCRAM, supra note 44, at 89.
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these agencies were first making major efforts to improve the quality of
their regulatory analyses. Next, I will report on the interesting results of
scoring twenty-five EPA regulations issued in the 1990s, all of which two
researchers had previously rated favorably on the desirable attribute of
“presents a range of total costs.”83 Third, I will describe in detail the treat-
ment of cost uncertainty and risk uncertainty in seven rules (and one retro-
spective program-evaluation study) from the EPA, OSHA, Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA), all but one of which were published within the past ten
years.
A. Scoring System
Table 5 presents, in ascending order of quality, ten discrete levels of
analysis of uncertainty in regulatory cost. I believe this level of detail is the
next step beyond most of the literature assessing the quality of regulatory
analyses,84 which have tended to score analyses via a checklist of dichoto-
mous attributes (e.g., Does the analysis present net benefit estimates or
doesn’t it? Does the analysis evaluate multiple regulatory alternatives or
only a single one?). My approach can be used with minor modification to
grade the treatment of risk uncertainty, but it effectively isolates one attri-
bute of quality: attention to cost uncertainty. It is therefore not suitable as a
grading system for the analyses as a whole. On the other hand, it provides
much more information about the quality of that one attribute than a di-
chotomous score possibly could. Indeed, I developed several of the specific
levels in the ten-point hierarchy precisely because other researchers85 had
concluded that doing it only that well was equivalent to doing the most
complete uncertainty analysis possible, at least insofar as a “Level 3” and a
“Level 10” analysis would receive the same checkmark.
Perhaps the most salient feature of this hierarchy is that fully half of the
gradations (Levels 1 through 5, inclusive) are not uncertainty analyses at all,
but rather are various ways to present one or more point estimates, without
actually considering the imprecision or incomplete knowledge that makes an
estimate uncertain. Although there are different kinds of uncertainty, surely
those that are endogenous to the regulation itself should be distinguished
83. See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do
Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 199, 202 (2007).
84. See generally Stuart Shapiro, The Evolution of Cost-Benefit Analysis in U.S. Regulatory
Decisionmaking, JERUSALEM PAPERS IN REG. & GOVERNANCE (Working Paper No. 5, 2010), avail-
able at http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp5.pdf; Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does
OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of
the Bush II Administration, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (special edition) 179 (2011); see infra note 106.
85. Supra note 84.
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TABLE 5. HIERARCHY OF HOW A REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
COULD DEAL WITH UNCERTAINTY IN REGULATORY COST
1. Point estimate of total cost (TC) only, with no mention of the word “uncertainty” 
2. Point estimate of TC, but with narrative caveat about its uncertainty (with or without actually 
using the word “uncertainty”—the narrative might say, for example, that “this regulation is 
expected to cost $567 million annually, but the true cost might be higher or lower than that.”) 
3. Two or more point estimates of TC, because the RIA considers two or more different regulatory 
interventions. 
4. Two or more point estimates of TC, because the RIA considers two or more mutually exclusive 
scenarios about how the regulated entities will comply with the regulation. (note—perhaps “level 
4A” would be an RIA that has both multiple interventions and multiple scenarios, as in the EPA 
Regional Haze RIA) 
5. A “quasi-range” for TC (it looks like a range, but in fact is composed of the multiple point 
estimates from level 3 or 4, connected with a hyphen to look like an actual statement about 
lower/upper bounds due to uncertainty). 
6. A statement of uncertainty in TC derived from a rule of thumb (e.g., “the point estimate plus or 
minus 20 percent”) (note: as in the EPA non-road diesel RIA) 
7. A statement of uncertainty in TC derived by f itting different estimates to a distribution. 
8. A partial Monte Carlo analysis of uncertainty in TC (in general, combining assumed uncertainties 
in only a couple of key input variables). 
9. An elaborate Monte Carlo analysis of parameter uncertainty in TC (note: as in the Stavins et al. 
unpublished re-analysis of the non-road diesel RIA, infra note 121) 
10. An elaborate Monte Carlo analysis of uncertainty in TC, plus multiple models for estimating 
costs, with or without expert elicitation of the weights that could be applied to the probability of 
each model being correct. 
from those that stem from our inability to discern how natural systems or
external actors will behave. The latter can be reduced via research, while the
former can be eliminated by simply deciding what one is actually analyzing.
For example, a “Level 3” uncertainty analysis would present two or more
point estimates of cost, not because of uncertainty in how expensive the
regulation would be, but because the agency had not yet decided what the
regulation would actually require (or was leaving it up to other actors to
decide). In reality, the agency is simply presenting two (or more) point
estimates within the same document—with no acknowledgment of uncer-
tainty. However, an evaluator scoring this analysis might well notice the
two disparate point estimates and applaud the agency for informing stake-
holders about “uncertainty.”86 Even more unfortunately, if the agency re-
packages the two (or more) point estimates into what appears to be a range
86. See infra Section VIII(D)1.
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(that is, reporting “[lower-higher]” in brackets rather than as two different
estimates explained as the results of a yet-to-be-determined choice about
regulatory scope), it is possible to confuse “range” with an actual statement
about the bounds of a single quantity made imprecise by true uncertainty.
Levels 6 to 10 of the hierarchy correspond to increased levels of detail,
creativity, and thoroughness in quantifying sources of uncertainty. Of
course, the entire system can easily be recast with “risk” replacing “cost” in
every instance, and used to grade the rigor of any risk characterization doc-
ument with respect to uncertainty.
B. “First-Generation” Baseline of Agency Analyses of
Cost and Risk Uncertainty
In this section, I examine two influential regulations—one final rule,
and one proposed rule that was not promulgated in its proposed form—both
of which represent some of the first attempts by two major human health
risk assessment agencies (EPA and OSHA) to conduct detailed QRAs.
These examples establish a strong finding: for several decades or more,
these agencies have successfully quantified uncertainty in risk using com-
putationally and theoretically advanced methods. At the very same time,
however, these agencies were generally paying no attention whatsoever to
uncertainty in cost.
1. 1986 EPA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) Land Disposal Restrictions87
Nearly thirty years ago, the EPA was already facile with Monte Carlo
analysis.88 In order to back-calculate the concentrations of various toxic sub-
stances in leachate from hazardous waste sites that would be expected to
exceed regulatory concentration limits in groundwater and surface water
used for drinking, the EPA derived pdfs (some normal or lognormal, some
uniform or log10 uniform, and some exponential) for roughly a dozen uncer-
tain parameters of a fate-and-transport model, and proposed to base levels
87. Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg.
1602 (Jan. 14, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-62, 264-65, 268, 270-71).
88. Monte Carlo simulation is a computational technique, first developed after World
War II, which gauges the uncertainty in an unknown quantity by repeatedly drawing random
samples from each of the variables that combine to produce the quantity. For example, the
estimate of E will be uncertain when the estimates of m and c are uncertain (in the famous
equation E=mc2). If the analyst can specify the uncertainties in m and c, she can derive the
uncertainty in E by arraying the results of many “simulations” of random values of m and c2
multiplied together. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary
Principle: Can They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 781 (2013).
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of regulatory concern on the 90th percentile of the output distribution.89 It
also proposed to allow facilities to use alternative modes of treatment other
than land disposal if a comparative risk analysis, using Monte Carlo meth-
ods for assessing both treatment and disposal, showed that the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the alternative was not significantly riskier
than the disposal option. But, for its analysis of regulatory cost, the EPA
presented an annualized cost estimate of $1.3 billion, with no consideration
of uncertainty.90
2. 1997 OSHA Methylene Chloride (MeCl2) Rule91
This final health standard contained an extremely detailed, wide-rang-
ing, and transparent analysis of the uncertainty in the carcinogenic potency
of MeCl2.92 OSHA performed an elaborate Bayesian Monte Carlo analy-
sis93 of the uncertainty in the physiologically-based pharmacokinetics of
how mice metabolize MeCl2, using prior pdfs for thirty-one different pa-
rameters (e.g., compartmental blood flows, tissue volumes, tissue:air parti-
tion coefficients, Michaelis-Menten metabolic parameters for the two
competing enzymatic pathways) derived from a meta-analysis of available
literature. It then updated these density functions using empirical Bayes
estimation in light of in vivo kinetic data from chamber studies of mice
exposed to various concentrations of MeCl2. This procedure also accounted
for all covariances among parameters, a computationally very complex re-
finement for 1997.94 OSHA then derived a pdf for human pharmacokinet-
ics, using human in vitro and in vivo data to calibrate the model.95 OSHA
89. Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal Restrictions, supra note 87,
at 1623-31.
90. EPA did present a range of from $93 to $154 million for a small offset of this cost
(the savings petitioners might realize through successful applications for variances), by con-
sidering different assumptions for the cost of filing a petition and the probability that a
random petition would be granted. Id. at 1742, 1746.
91. Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1,494 (Jan. 10, 1997)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926).
92. Id. OSHA does not put a priority on assessing uncertainty in exposure, because its
health standards set the new (enforceable) exposure limit directly as a point estimate, and
under the Supreme Court Benzene decision, OSHA needs only to show that some exposures
under prevailing conditions pose a “significant risk of material health impairment.” Indus.
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
93. Adding Bayesian analysis to a Monte Carlo simulation basically means combining
prior beliefs about the uncertain random variables involved with the results of experiments
on some or all of those variables, so as to adjust their distributions before drawing the
random values from them.
94. See Fŕedéric Y. Bois, Analysis of PBPK Models for Risk Characterization, 895 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 317, 319 (1999).
95. Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, supra note 92, at 1535.
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further handled model uncertainty in several different ways: (1) it presented
estimates both from PBPK analysis of potency and from potency derived by
allometric (body weight and surface-area) scaling, while explaining in detail
why it concluded that the PBPK approach yielded more defensible esti-
mates in this case;96 (2) it presented separate results for two theoretical
variants on the PBPK model (one in which the mouse physiologic parame-
ters were allowed to vary across the different dose groups in the MeCl2
carcinogenicity bioassay, and one in which they were assumed to be dose-
independent), while explaining its preference for the former assumption;97
and (3) it explained in great detail why it was unconvinced by a series of
recent journal articles claiming that rodent tumors were irrelevant to human
risk due to a purported fundamental biochemical difference between ro-
dents and humans.98 OSHA described the end result of all this analysis as a
CDF for excess lifetime cancer risk at the new PEL for MeCl2 of twenty-
five ppm.99 That CDF demarcates a factor of forty-five uncertainty separat-
ing the 95th percentile upper bound (a risk of roughly 3.6x10-3) from the
5th percentile (roughly 8x10-5).100
In contrast, the MeCl2 cost analysis concluded, in its entirety, that: (1)
the regulation will cost American industry exactly $101,463,037 per year;101
(2) the most-affected industry sector—furniture stripping—would face com-
pliance costs equal to exactly 2.04 percent of sales revenue;102 and (3) the
most heavily-affected small businesses—certain manufacturers of flexible
polyurethane foam—would face costs equal to 60.3 percent of their profits,
but that a price increase of 2.1 percent in this subsector would suffice to
fully restore profits to pre-rule levels.103 The word “uncertainty” does not
appear anywhere in the cost section of the regulation or the accompanying
analyses; the only hint of any “wiggle room” in the nine-significant-figure
total cost estimate is found in one paragraph, explaining that “[i]t is impor-
tant to understand that OSHA’s methodology tends to overstate the eco-
nomic impacts of the standard.”104
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, having completed all
the uncertainty analysis in risk, OSHA acknowledged that “only feasibility
has constrained the Agency from reducing the eight-hour time-weighted
96. Id. at 1556-59.
97. Id. at 1547.
98. Id. at 1520-22.
99. Id. at 1555.
100. See id. at 1555-56.
101. Id. at 1567, tbl.VIII-4.
102. Id. at 1567-68, tbl.VIII-5.
103. Id. at 1570, tbl.VIII-6.
104. Id. at 1568.
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average (TWA) PEL in the final rule . . . because even at ten ppm, the risk
remaining is significant.”105 In other words, even if the true risk was higher,
or a factor of forty-five (or even more) below the level estimated in the
potency analysis, OSHA would still have promulgated a twenty-five ppm
PEL, because that was the lowest feasible level. The gaping unanswered
question is, “how confident can or should OSHA have been that twenty-five
ppm was exactly the lowest feasible level?” Only the unperformed analysis
of uncertainty in cost could have shed light on this pivotal question.
In terms of the ten-level hierarchy mentioned supra, I would conclude
that the treatment of cost uncertainty in the EPA leachate analysis merited
a score of 1, or perhaps a 2 if one credits the single sentence about possible
cost overestimation as a “narrative caveat about uncertainty.” The OSHA
cost analysis merits a score of one. In light of the Monte Carlo analysis of
dose-response, plus the various elaborations on model uncertainty, the
MeCl2 risk analysis clearly merits a score of ten for risk uncertainty; the
EPA risk analysis would receive a score of at least eight. The contrast could
not be much more stark.
C. Scoring of Twenty-Four EPA Rules from the 1990s
In order to make a much more general observation about the treatment
of cost uncertainty during the recent past, I re-examined what is probably
the most thorough scoring of the quality of regulatory impact analyses
(RIAs) produced before 2000—the series of articles by Hahn and Dudley.106
These researchers dissected seventy-four RIAs produced by the EPA during
the Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, which they indicate re-
present all available RIAs from EPA during that period.107 Notably, Hahn
and Dudley concluded that one-third of the rules (twenty-five of seventy-
four) “provided a range estimate of total costs,”108 which would certainly
suggest that EPA was acknowledging and quantifying cost uncertainty rou-
tinely, if not across-the-board, during the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s.
A careful look at these twenty-five praiseworthy analyses, however,
reveals quite a different picture. As Figure 3 shows, only a single one of the
twenty-five EPA analyses scored higher than five of ten in the scale I devel-
105. Id. at 1580.
106. Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do
Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Patrick
M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis? (AEI-Brookings
Joint Ctr. For Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-01, 2004).
107. Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do
Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 199 (2007).
108. Id.
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oped supra.109 Assuming reasonably that none of the forty-nine rules Hahn
and Dudley scored negatively on “provided a range estimate of total costs”
quantified uncertainty at all, this revised tally of one of seventy-four sug-
gests that only roughly one or two percent of the time did EPA do more to
acknowledge cost uncertainty than to present a “quasi-range.” Considering
all twenty-four rules, the average score on my one-to-ten scale was 3.68, and
there was no improvement when comparing the eight analyses issued in the
1980s (having an average score = 3.75) to the seventeen rules issued in the
1990s (having an average score = 3.65).
FIGURE 3. COST UNCERTAINTY SCORING OF EPA REGULATIONS
PRESENTED IN THIS ARTICLE
Why the discrepancy between Hahn and Dudley’s dichotomous scoring
and this ten-point scale, on which twenty-four of the twenty-five “positive”
analyses failed to address uncertainty? In a few cases, I think Hahn and
Dudley may have confused disaggregated point estimates with a “range.”
For example, in a 1998 rule setting emission standards for locomotives, the
EPA subdivided the total cost estimate by three different categories of loco-
motives, despite the fact that this was clearly not an expression of uncer-
tainty. In most cases, the issue involved mistaking multiple point
109. The outlier was a 1992 rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act, in which EPA
conducted a simple Monte Carlo analysis in cost. By considering the uncertainty in each of
several variables, EPA concluded that although the best estimate of regulatory cost was $46
million per year, the cost could reasonably be as low as $1 million/yr. or as high as $128
million/yr. Drinking Water 57 Fed. Reg. 31,776, 31,831-32 (July 17, 1992).
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estimates—whether expressed as such or with the lowest and highest esti-
mates packaged into what appears to be a range estimate—as expressions of
incertitude when in fact they were expressions of indecision. As Section
VIII(A) supra discusses, a statement indicating that “costs are estimated be-
tween $X and $Y” certainly can appear to be a conclusion about the impre-
cision of EPA’s ability to forecast cost, but it can also be something else
entirely. Several times in this sample, EPA produced two incompatible but
infinitely precise point estimates of what it would cost for each of two alter-
native regulatory requirements that it or its state agencies with delegated
implementation authority had not yet chosen between, and either presented
the two estimates together or packaged them into an [$X-$Y] “quasi-range.”
This is akin to saying “it will take as little as six hours to drive to Disney-
land, or as many as forty-six hours to drive to Disney World, depending on
which destination we choose,” and then having someone interpret that
“range” between six and forty-six hours as an indication of how uncertain
the road and traffic conditions will be. In other cases, EPA believed it could
not resolve a fundamental ambiguity about how industry would choose to
comply with the regulatory requirements, and presented two different cost
estimates; this is in some sense a reflection of true uncertainty, but not in
the sense of imprecision that more data could reduce. Even if we expand the
definition of uncertainty to encompass not knowing which of two behavioral
responses to regulation will predominate, surely packaging the two contin-
gent estimates into a range conveys incorrectly the impression that all cost
values between the two endpoints are possible, and perhaps even equiprob-
able (as a uniform distribution of uncertainty would denote).
Until very recently, therefore, while the typical treatment of risk uncer-
tainty continued to improve and become more rigorous, the treatment of
cost uncertainty had rarely improved beyond depictions that arguably were
even less informative than a single point estimate would have been. At least
a single cost figure expressed with eight to ten significant digits can be
interpreted as “what they conclude when they don’t even want to think
about error.”
D. Scoring of Selected EPA, OSHA, FDA, and Department of
Transportation (DOT) Rules from 1999 and Forward
In this section, I will review, in chronological sequence, selected envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regulations issued by EPA, OSHA, FDA, and
DOT in recent years, in order to gauge newer developments in the treat-
ment of uncertainty in regulatory cost. I did not attempt an exhaustive or
random sample of regulations from these four agencies (except in the case
of OSHA, which only issued one relevant worker health standard between
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2001-2010), but I did contact high-ranking career officials who steered me
to these rules as examples of the regulatory impact analyses they were most
proud of.
1. EPA Regional Haze Rule110
In 1999, EPA published an extensive CBA on a rule to reduce regional
haze and provided “uncertainty in net benefits” estimates.111 EPA offered
four different “ranges” for net benefit, corresponding to two different possi-
ble enforcement regimes—either controlling sources of haze to attain an
absolute improvement of one “deciview” in visibility or attaining a relative
improvement of five percent over the baseline—and two different levels of
stringency for each measure.112 However, each “range” between the low-end
and high-end estimates was constructed by subtracting a point estimate for
cost from either an upper-bound or a lower-bound estimate of benefit.113
The document states that “the expected annual control cost nationwide in
2015 . . . ranges from between $0 to a maximum of $4.4 billion,”114 but as
with so many of the EPA rules in the previous section, this is a “quasi-
range,” consisting of the highest and lowest value from the four mutually-
exclusive scenarios, further extended by conflating uncertainty and variabil-
ity. The “range” includes sub-costs for each of six U.S. regions, which ex-
plains how the lower bound can be zero—it is a point estimate under one
scenario for one part of the country only.
2. EPA Non-Road Diesel Rule115
This 2004 rule (controlling emissions from diesel engines in agricul-
tural and other off-road vehicles) is among the first, to my knowledge,
where EPA actually imposed a quantitative uncertainty bound on total
cost.116 EPA presented a table of five previous regulations where it had
predicted ex ante various increases in the price of gasoline or diesel fuel,
and noted that ex post, the predictions were all overestimates, by a trivial
110. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL REGIONAL HAZE
RULE (1999).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 10-4, tbl. 10-3.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 6-3.
115. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS
FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES (2004).
116. The only counter-example I could find was the 1992 drinking water rule described
supra in note 109.
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amount up to a factor of 2.2.117 EPA concluded: “given the uncertainty in
estimating costs, we believe it is appropriate to consider the potential for
both overestimation and underestimation,”118 and took its point estimate of
total cost and added a plus/minus twenty percent error bound to it.119 This
uncertainty is objectively smaller than previous real cases of “surprise,”120
and I am at a loss to explain why it is symmetric—i.e., why it allows for both
underestimation and overestimation, when all the previous cases considered
were exclusively of the latter type—but at least it is less overconfident than
a point estimate.
Interestingly, EPA contracted with Stavins et al. after the rule was pub-
lished to conduct a much fuller treatment of cost uncertainty.121 In that
document, the consultants performed a fairly elaborate Monte Carlo simula-
tion, including distributional assumptions for the cost per improved diesel
engine (based on a regression equation of engine displacement on price),
the historical uncertainty in the cost of the platinum catalyst needed, the
“progress ratio” of technological learning in previous cases (which itself is
uncertain), and other factors. They concluded with ninety-five percent con-
fidence that the total cost would be between 1.7 times the mean estimate
and (1/1.7th) of it (that is, a lognormal uncertainty), as compared to EPA’s
+/- 20 percent estimate.122 In my opinion, this unpublished consultant’s re-
port still represents one of the best—and, perhaps, the single best—cost
uncertainty analysis done by or for EPA.
3. Resources for the Future (RFF) Analysis of the EPA
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
Krupnick et al. at Resources for the Future (RFF) wrote a report in
2009 about how EPA should better quantify uncertainty.123 The centerpiece
of the report was a “mock briefing” to senior EPA management about the
costs and benefits of a regulation based closely on CAIR.124 Figure 5-3 in
the RFF document presents a “probability density function for net benefit,”
117. CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES, supra note 115, at 9-59, tbl. 9-
21.
118. Id. at 9-59.
119. Id. at 9-60.
120. See James K. Hammitt & Alexander I. Shlyakhter, The Expected Value of Information
and the Probability of Surprise, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 135, 136 (1999).
121. Robert N. Stavins, Judson Jaffe, Peter Hess, Edmund Crouch, Laura Green, and
Shailesh Sahay, Monte Carlo Analysis: An Introduction to and Application of Formal Quan-
titative Assessment of Uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analysis (2004) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with the author).
122. Id. at 20.
123. NOT A SURE THING, supra note 32.
124. Id. at 203-17.
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but the accompanying table of data makes clear that the “uncertainty” in net
benefit takes no contribution from cost; it is a pdf for benefit less a single point
estimate for cost. At least at this point in time, the nation’s preeminent think-
tank for environmental economics was advising EPA that, not only could it
safely ignore uncertainty in cost, but it could present half an uncertainty
distribution as a complete one.
4. OSHA Chromium-6 Regulation125
This RIA is essentially unchanged in its treatment of uncertainty from
the methylene chloride rule made nine years before. The risk assessment is
ornate, with ten different sets of confidence intervals from the epidemiol-
ogy of chromium-6 and lung cancer (including two different models (rela-
tive-risk and additive-risk), two different reference populations, and two
different ways of grouping exposures, plus two other models that did not
depend on the reference or grouping choice).126 Meanwhile, the cost assess-
ment is presented as precise to nine significant figures (a total annualized
cost of $282,365,793),127 and the only nod to uncertainty in cost is the use
of two mutually exclusive discount rates (3 percent and 7 percent).128
5. FDA Dietary Supplements Rule129
At essentially the same period that EPA and OSHA were presenting
single-point estimates for regulatory cost,130 FDA was undertaking Monte
Carlo analyses on both sides of the ledger.131 In its 2007 rule on dietary
supplements, FDA presented a benefits estimate for imposing good manu-
facturing practices (GMPs) on makers of supplements that ranged (with a
90 percent credible interval) from $36 million per year to $54 million per
year;132 the uncertainty was primarily due to lack of knowledge about what
percent of total illnesses due to contaminated supplements was actually be-
ing reported.133 At the same time, FDA considered uncertainties in the cost
per test to verify purity of the products, in the number of establishments
125. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100 (Feb. 28,
2006) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10,267, tbl. VIII-4.
128. Id. at 10,263, 10,267, 10,308.
129. Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packaging, Labeling or
Holding Operations for Dietary Supplements, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,752 (June 25, 2007) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 111).
130. See supra notes 115, 125.
131. Id. at 34,936.
132. Id. tbl. 32.
133. Id. at 34,936.
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that would have to comply with GMP, and in the mean number of different
batches each establishment would have to test, and came up with a range of
predicted costs that extended from $109 million per year to $260 million
per year.134 Although FDA almost exclusively used two- or three-category
discrete variables in this analysis, assigning equal probability to each possi-
ble realization of each input (for one variable, the uncertainty in the cost of
each test, FDA used a continuous (beta) distribution),135 it is nevertheless
among the earliest probabilistic treatments of cost uncertainty from within
a health and safety regulatory agency.
6. NHTSA Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Rule136
This rule from 2007 has an elaborate Monte Carlo analysis137 of both
benefits—including lives saved, traffic delays lessened, and property damage
averted—and costs, and presents both 90 percent confidence intervals and
“total ranges” (i.e., 100 percent confidence bounds) for each. However, the
uncertainty in cost turns out to be limited to one factor—the cost of antilock
brakes and ESC for the vehicles that need them (the number of such vehi-
cles is assumed to be known precisely)138—and that uncertainty is simply
asserted to be “+/- 10 percent.” Thus, the total range for costs is simply the
mean total cost of $985 million plus or minus $98 million, which yields the
reported range of [$889 - $1082 million].
7. NHTSA Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) Standard139
By the next year (2008), NHTSA had made its uncertainty analysis in
cost significantly more rigorous. Here, it looked at forty-one different tech-
134. Id. Although in this case the pdf for cost statistically dominated the pdf for benefit,
FDA made the case that there were a large number of categories of “unquantifiable benefits”
that together justified this rule despite the unfavorable sign of [B-C].
135. See id. at 34,932.
136. U.S. DEP ’T. TRANSP., FMVSS NO. 126, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.:
ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (2007).
137. See id. at section VIII.
138. Actually, this is a deficiency in the analysis worth noting: NHTSA explains that
“Although vehicle sales have gradually increased over time, they are subject to annual varia-
tion due to changes in economic conditions, which are difficult to predict. Thus, the number
of vehicles (vi) is treated as a constant.” Id. at VIII-12. I think an uncertainty analyst would
instead have written “. . . which are difficult to predict. Thus, the number of vehicles is
treated as a uniform pdf between the lowest and highest previous values for annual sales”, or
something similar.
139. U.S. DEP ’T. TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS: CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2011-2015 PASSENGER CARS AND
LIGHT TRUCKS (2008).
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nologies to increase fuel efficiency and gathered data on the full range of
published cost estimates for each.140 NHTSA assumed that the range repre-
sented +/- three standard deviations from the mean (Gaussian distribution),
and through Monte Carlo simulation derived a total cost estimate (for buy-
ers of model year 2015 cars) of between approximately $10.940 and $19.842
billion (with a 90 percent confidence interval).141
8. FDA Shell Egg Rule142
This final rule from 2009 contains a Monte Carlo analysis for both costs
and benefits, of roughly equal complexity. On the cost side, FDA looked at
nine different contributors to the total cost of the rule, and modeled the
uncertainty in each, to yield an overall cost estimate of between $57.5 mil-
lion and $116.5 million per year143—the largest contributor to cost uncer-
tainty being the difficulty pinning down how many egg production facilities
were experiencing problems controlling rodents on-site, and hence how
many would have to invest in new controls.144
9. EPA Portland Cement National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)145
In 2009, EPA presented an RIA for the net benefits of this major rule,
and again made it appear that it had considered the major uncertainties.146
Figure 4 shows fourteen different values for net benefit (each under two
scenarios of the discount rate), but the legend reveals that the spectrum
comes from fourteen different risk estimates “minus the cost estimate” (em-
phasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id. at X-19.
142. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage,
and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33030 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 16,
118).
143. Id. at 33,081-87.
144. Id. at 33,083.
145. RTI INT’L, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS FROM THE PORTLAND CEMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (2009).
146. Id. at 5-12 – 5-14.
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FIGURE 4. MISLEADING DEPICTION OF UNCERTAINTY IN NET
BENEFITS (FROM THE EPA PORTLAND CEMENT
NESHAP (2009))
10. EPA Clean Air Act CBA
One of EPA’s most recent major analyses of regulatory costs and bene-
fits—the 2011 study estimating all the health, environmental, and economic
impacts of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) up to the year
2020—represents an excellent example of the disparity between the treat-
ment of scientific uncertainty as opposed to economic uncertainty.147 The
vast difference between the width of the confidence intervals for benefit
and for cost provides a strong hint that commensurate attention was not
paid on each side of the benefit/cost ledger. Indeed, in the summary table of
benefits and costs (on the third unnumbered page of the document), the
annual monetized benefits estimated for the year 2020 range from $250
billion (a 5th percentile estimate) to $5.7 trillion (a 95th percentile esti-
mate)—a large “uncertainty ratio” of twenty-three-fold—while the cost esti-
mate for 2020 of $65 billion is presented with no uncertainty whatsoever.
One has to turn to Chapter 3 to discover that EPA did consider four spe-
cific “tweaks” to the total cost estimate as a rudimentary sort of sensitivity
analysis of cost uncertainty148: (1) if localities were to cap the controls they
147. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM
1990 TO 2020 (2011).
148. Id. at 3-11 – 3-19.
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required at $10,000 per ton of ozone or fine particles removed (rather than
the $15,000/ton cap EPA assumes they will apply as the base case), the costs
of all local controls would drop by about $3.6 billion in 2020; (2) if volatile
gasoline prices cause consumers to shift to more fuel-efficient vehicles at a
higher rate than assumed in the base case, the cost of CAAA controls on
motor vehicles could be about $1 billion less than assumed; (3) if EPA’s
base case greatly overestimated the rate at which passenger cars would fail
state inspection tests, the costs of CAAA controls to upgrade vehicle emis-
sions systems could be about $3.4 billion less than assumed; and (4) if,
instead of the base case “learning rate” (10 percent per year) at which the
costs of certain control technologies would decline as industry gained expe-
rience, EPA instead assumed a 20 percent learning rate, the total costs of
CAAA controls in 2020 would decline by $4 billion over the base case. If,
instead, EPA assumed a more pessimistic 5 percent learning rate, the total
costs would increase by about $2 billion.
Table 3-3149 in the report does not provide any information about the
possible combined effects of these four alternate assumptions, but if one
treats them all as independent, the minimum total cost in 2020 would be
approximately $12 billion less than the base case ($3.6 + $1 + $3.4 + $4
billion in decrements), and the maximum total cost would be about $2 bil-
lion more than the base case (if the one source of cost underestimation was
invoked), for a range of $53 billion to $68 billion. This represents an “un-
certainty ratio” of only 1.3-fold, as compared to the twenty-three-fold ratio
for benefits uncertainty.
Obviously, just being at least twenty times more confident about a cost
estimate than about the corresponding risk and benefits estimate does not
necessarily reflect overconfidence or carelessness about cost. Perhaps we ac-
tually can be at least ninety percent confident that in the year 2020, busi-
nesses and consumers will spend more than $53 billion, but no more than
$68 billion, to effectuate all of the requirements of the CAAA. But in this
case, I believe a comparison of the effort EPA made to consider cost uncer-
tainty versus risk uncertainty reveals that a serious imbalance across the
cost/benefit ledger continues as a hallmark of EPA practice. The four sensi-
tivity “tweaks” that comprise the entire QUA of cost uncertainty are de-
scribed in three pages, are dichotomous rather than distributional in nature,
are not even combined into a single minimum-maximum range, and seem
on their face to be overconfident even as descriptors of isolated parameter
uncertainties. For example, EPA somewhat inexplicably uses as the maxi-
mum potential “technological learning rate” the 20 percent figure that it
149. Id. at 3-14, tbl. 3-3.
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cites as the “central tendency presented in the peer-reviewed literature for
several technologies.”150
In comparison, EPA takes uncertainty in risk quite seriously in this
report. EPA treated separately the uncertainty in how air quality may
change under the CAAA (that is, uncertainty in emissions combined with
uncertainty in the relationship between emissions and ambient concentra-
tion) and how changes in air quality can lead to changes in either human
health outcomes or ecological outcomes. EPA quantified uncertainty in the
concentration-response relationships for human health by considering both
a host of parameter uncertainties (e.g., the potential for exposure misclas-
sification caused by fixed, rather than personal, monitors, and the resulting
concern about bias towards the null hypothesis) and by conducting various
expert elicitations to estimate the probability that certain key alternative
theories may be correct (thereby accounting for some model uncertainty).151
EPA then conducted a Monte Carlo simulation with distributional assump-
tions for all input parameters,152 and further combined these results with a
distribution for the uncertainty (which is really a distribution depicting con-
troversy) in the acceptable estimates for the value of a statistical life (and a
life-year).153
So it is somewhat strange that the summary table that purports to be
the bottom-line comparison of benefits and costs154 carries through all of
table 7-5 carries through all of the QUA for benefit uncertainty, but fails to
even acknowledge or cross-reference the limited sensitivity analysis on cost
uncertainty. This table provides a low, central, and high range of estimates
for net benefit, but it is fairly clear that this “quasi-range” results from subtracting
a point estimate for cost from a range estimate for benefit. As with so many of
EPA’s (and other federal agencies’) other public statements about uncer-
tainty in net benefit, this is a misnomer reflecting uncertainty in risk and
(infinite) overconfidence in cost.
Even in the qualitative summary of uncertainty in costs and benefits,
where the Agency is able to provide caveats about its degree of confidence
free of any numerical straightjacket, it is clear that EPA’s default posture is to
treat “risks as uncertain unless we can show they are certain,” but to treat costs as
“certain until proven uncertain.” Table 7-6, which lists the “potentially major
sources of uncertainty for estimating the costs and benefits of the CAAA,”
acknowledges ten sources of risk uncertainty, three sources of uncertainty in
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5-36 – 5-49.
152. Id. at 7-3, n. 102.
153. Id. at 7-14, tbl. 7-7.
154. Id. at 7-9, tbl. 7-5.
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valuation of health effects, and zero sources of cost uncertainty.155 It is true
that earlier in the document, EPA identified twelve different possible (but
unquantifiable) sources of cost uncertainty156 (the four “tweaks” discussed
supra, plus others), and that EPA justifies not including any of these twelve
in Table 7-6 because that table is reserved for “major” potential sources of
uncertainty (that is, ones that could affect the net benefit estimate by more
than five percent). But I find a great degree of circular reasoning at work
here. First, since in the case of the CAAA, benefits exceed costs by about
thirty-fold, we could wipe away costs completely, or double them, without chang-
ing the net benefit estimate by more than five percent. So, this is a strange crite-
rion—it makes major changes in cost into minor (that is, ultimately
unmentioned) changes in net benefit. In some of the cases, EPA has worked
even harder to relegate cost uncertainty to the “minor” category: in the
discussion of compliance cost overestimation bias, for example,157 EPA di-
vides the biases into roughly five different categories, and then says that
“the magnitude of these biases varies substantially, but in no case would we
expect the overall net impact to exceed 5 percent of overall net benefits.”158
In other words, a category that could comprise five separate “minor” effects
is kept “minor” through disaggregation. Ultimately, the treatment of cost
uncertainty has the flavor of an a priori determination that each effect is
“minor,” and then the conclusion that a whole suite of “minor” effects must
be unimportant even when taken as a whole.
In summary, FDA and NHTSA seem to have leapfrogged over EPA and
OSHA in the care with which they balance the analytical treatment of uncertainty
in both benefits and costs.
IX. PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF REASONS FOR
INATTENTION TO COST UNCERTAINTY
In this section, I offer some explanations, grounded in personal experi-
ence and extensive interactions with other current and former regulatory
officials, risk analysts, and economists, for the basic asymmetry or dise-
quilibrium documented in this Article. Why did risk analysts begin to ac-
knowledge and quantify uncertainty long before regulatory economists
began to, and why, to this day, is cost uncertainty more typically an after-
thought (whereas risk uncertainty is more of a core attribute)? The forces
leading to this asymmetry involve, and to some extent transcend, discipli-
nary and organizational boundaries. Regulatory analysis and action is an
155. Id. at 7-11, tbl. 7-6.
156. Id. at 3-17 – 3-19, tbl. 3-4.
157. Id. at 3-19, tbl. 3-4.
158. Id.
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arena where scholarship meets law, policy, and politics. The toxicologist or
economist who comes to work at a regulatory agency has to reconcile de-
mands from her profession, her agency colleagues and superiors, OIRA,
Congress and the judiciary, and from the industry, public, and other stake-
holders affected by her analysis. Each kind of actor in this arena brings
preconceptions about uncertainty, and the resulting product will likely be
determined by the complex interactions among them.
Accordingly, I offer four categories of reasons to help explain the rela-
tive inattention to cost uncertainty, guided in part by the landmark typol-
ogy developed by political scientist Graham Allison. In his book about the
Cuban Missile Crisis,159 Allison suggested three different lenses through
which one could explain the behavior of complex organizations: a classic
unitary rational actor model, a bureaucratic model (wherein seeming irratio-
nalities may be the result of an agency acting according to its standard
operating procedures rather than utility maximization), and a political
model (wherein the result of a clash among actors may, like the outcomes of
vector algebra, have “magnitude and direction” different than that of any
single expressed preference).160 The first two categories infra (“practical/
empirical” and “normative”) correspond roughly with the first lens; the key
question analysis must ask here is “how might the typical economist view
uncertainty and the responsibility to explore it?” The third category (“bu-
reaucratic”) explores the classic set of organizational factors that shape and
constrain group outputs, and the fourth category (“disciplinary”) views reg-
ulations and RIAs as developed by compromise and struggle, where the
nature and intensity of economists’ influence on analysis is shaped by their
training and orientation.
A. Practical and Empirical Explanations
• Producers of regulatory cost analyses (i.e., economists) and con-
sumers thereof (i.e., agency managers, leaders of oversight
processes, and stakeholders) may believe that uncertainties in
regulatory cost are either trivially small, or are very small and
distributed symmetrically about the point estimate most easily
generated. Therefore, producers do not tend to “waste time”
quantifying what is unimportant, and consumers do not feel de-
159. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
(1971).
160. See JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 142 (1974).
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prived by the lack of more detail.161 RIA producers and consum-
ers may believe that cost uncertainty is not trivial in an absolute
sense, but it is so small relative to uncertainty in risk (or benefit),
and so small relative to the “distance” between expected cost and
expected benefit, that little information is lost by fixating on the
latter to the exclusion of the former. In other words, if the lower
confidence bound on benefit—a function of the mean benefit and
its uncertainty—is much, much greater than the (overconfident)
“upper confidence bound” on cost, deriving a more honest uncer-
tainty distribution for cost would not change the fact that B >>
C.162 A more sophisticated version of this explanation would state
that the uncertainty distribution for net benefit ignoring uncer-
tainty in cost is approximately the same distribution as the one
including it. Therefore, little of value to the decision is lost by
using the much more easily obtained surrogate. For example, if
the agency could conclude that net benefits were positive with 90
percent probability (because, perhaps, there was a 10 percent
chance that the risks were greatly overestimated), and a complete
uncertainty analysis in cost would change that probability to 89
percent or to 91 percent, little would be gained (other than sym-
metry and insulation from criticism) by conducting an analysis of
cost uncertainty.
• Economists and others may believe that, although regulatory
costs are significantly uncertain in the long run, at least two fac-
tors—the attenuation of future costs and benefits via temporal
discounting, and the fact that future analysts and decisionmakers
will be able to adjust the regulation as more information ac-
crues—make these future uncertainties a low priority for present-
day explanation.
161. However, one of the other articles developed during the NSF project represents
the first large psychometric survey of laypeople aimed at understanding how they perceive
regulatory costs and the uncertainty therein. Johnson & Finkel, supra note 21. This survey
revealed that laypeople generally believe that regulatory cost estimates are no less uncertain
than risk estimates are.
162. Such thinking, I hasten to add, reflects a simplistic but common view that the only
function of depicting uncertainty in net benefit is to gauge how confident we can be about
whether the net benefit of a particular decision option is positive (or negative). But quantita-
tive ambiguity within the category of positive (or negative) net benefit can be hugely impor-
tant, if it could make the option chosen inferior to a different option! The question should
not be “are we sure that Option A has positive net benefit?”, but “are we sure that Option A
has greater net benefit than any other option?”—and this latter question can be quite sensi-
tive to perturbations in net benefit.
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• Conversely, but to the same effect, economists and others may
believe that cost uncertainty is indeed large, but that it is also
inscrutable or intractable. The importance of acknowledging large
uncertainties has to be balanced against the difficulty of doing so
in a credible way, and in many realms of policy analysis we tacitly
agree to ignore aspects that are both influential and daunting. On
the human health risk side, we have always operated by sus-
pending our disbelief in stochastic dose-response. It is possible
that every individual health effect is literally predestined (i.e.,
individual risks are either zero or one, and no one actually faces a
risk equal to the population average), but until we learn enough
about toxicogenomics and interindividual (and intra-individual)
variations in susceptibility to forecast effects rather than estimate
risks, we make do with the more tractable—and perhaps correct—
stance. The analogous question on the cost side is whether, in the
absence of a comprehensive model of the economy, we should try
to quantify the uncertainty in those costs we can estimate, or
should instead treat cost as precise, contingent on our not being
able to even start modeling the big imprecisions. Influential re-
ports about both risk and cost uncertainty have cautioned about
the problem of “uncertain uncertainty” in different ways.163 The
1996 PCCRAM report, for example, essentially concluded that
we should not strive to quantify uncertainty at all, in risk or in
cost, because of the danger of providing a false sense that we
know how uncertain we are.164 Various commentators have criti-
cized this logic, stating that the more worrisome response would
be to provide a point estimate that conveys even more overconfi-
dence.165 By 2009, an influential climate change report166 had a
more constructive and logical response to this problem: “unlike
physical parameters of the climate system, socioeconomic and
technological factors need not remain constant over time . . . we
should regard these uncertainty estimates of future socio-eco-
nomic outcomes with less confidence than those of physical pa-
163. Matthew Corder & Martin Weale, Uncertain Uncertainty, 17 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 542
(2013).
164. Supra note 44.
165. M. Granger Morgan, Regulation under Uncertainty, Slide Presentation at the
Workshop on Expert Judgment: Promises and Pitfalls, Resources for the Future, Washington
DC (March 13, 2006) at slide 22; Adam M. Finkel, The Joy Before Cooking: Preparing Ourselves
to Write a Risk Research Recipe, 8 HUM . & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1203 (2002).
166. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, BEST PRACTICE APPROACHES FOR CHARACTERIZ-
ING, COMMUNICATING, AND INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN DECISION MAKING (2009).
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rameters.”167 In other words, it is possible to express uncertainty
in cost, while realizing that some uncertainty estimates are more
or less firm than others. Unfortunately, the contrary view—that
cost uncertainty is too precarious to quantify—may continue to
dominate this more constructive reconciliation.
• A stronger form of the argument presented supra holds that costs
are simply not a proper subject for rigorous analysis at all. I be-
lieve this to be a very powerful point, albeit a difficult one to
explain. First, let’s consider some aspect of the good or harm
done by a regulatory intervention that we all might agree is prop-
erly outside the domain of quantification. Perhaps we could agree
that no cost-benefit analysis should be attempted to gauge the
wisdom of establishing a market for donor organs; even if “net
benefit” could be shown to increase if such a market was permit-
ted, the effects on the fabric of society might more properly be
managed outside the domain of monetized comparisons. As
strange as it may seem, I see evidence that we tend to regard regu-
latory costs themselves as similarly non-quantifiable by choice. The in-
fluential 1992 Habicht memorandum at EPA, for example, rather
offhandedly explained that it sought to impel extensive uncer-
tainty analysis in risk, but to ignore uncertainty in cost, by cast-
ing aside “the non-scientific considerations (e.g., economic and societal
factors) that are considered along with the risk assessment in risk
management and decision-making”.168 If “economic factors” (that
is, costs!) are properly dealt with in the same way sacred moral
judgments are—that is, not by quantitative comparisons, but by
political dialogue—then there is no point in quantifying cost with
anywhere near the same rigor with which we quantify the “scien-
tific considerations.”169 By lumping together “economic” and “so-
cietal” factors, and placing them in apposition to scientific ones,
we relegate economics to the “soft” side of the firewall separating
risk assessment from risk management,170 and we send a powerful
167. Id. at 42-43.
168. Memorandum from F. Henry Habicht, II, Deputy Administrator, U.S. EPA, to
Assistant and Regional Administrators, U.S. EPA, Guidance on Risk Characterization for
Risk Managers and Risk Assessors, at 4 (Feb. 26, 1992) (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAG-
ING THE PROCESS (1983) at 6-7. See also Hoffmann, supra note 19 at 1347. Hoffmann observes
that the “conventional wisdom” places economics as part of risk management and not of risk
assessment, and criticizes this as a “limited view[ ] of the role and contribution economics as
a discipline can make to risk assessment.”
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and paradoxical message that costs are, in a sense, “too important
to quantify.” But why, then, do we quantify them? It is, of course,
possible to compare non-numerical considerations impressionisti-
cally or via a referendum, but very difficult to compare numerical
quantities non-numerically! If we really intend to treat costs as
non-quantifiable, then we ought not to quantify them, and espe-
cially not with false precision. It is not clear whether the Habicht
memorandum is saying that economics is sacred or just that it is
“soft”—lumping together “economic and societal” considerations
suggests that costs are akin to preferences, which are inputs to
decisionmaking that are not physical quantities and that are hard
to measure. Are costs really things we use impressionistically to
tweak a decision with respect to the anchor point we arrive at by
considering risk alone? This view is not incoherent, but neither is
it consistent with political and bureaucratic reality. As stated
supra, real decisions often balance on a narrow fulcrum of cost—a
little more cost than the line can handle and the decision changes
abruptly. If we insist on treating costs as “soft,” then we need a
decision rule that doesn’t treat them as “hard!”171
B. Normative Explanations
• The empirical assumption that uncertainty in cost is small can be
trumped by the normative assumption that uncertainty simply
does not matter (whatever its breadth) because the expected value
of cost tells society all it needs to know. This view is equivalent
to asserting that society is (or should be) “risk-neutral” with re-
spect to uncertainty in cost; that we are (or should be) indifferent
between a certain cost of $X and a pdf for cost whose expected
value is $X. This is a natural assumption—at the societal level,
uncertainties about the mean should not affect decisionmaking,
especially when each decision is part of a large portfolio of ac-
tions, and when large deviations from each expected value will
“even out,” such that the grand mean of all total-cost outcomes
will have small uncertainty. Indeed, this view was first invoked
with respect to uncertainty in risk in the relatively distant past.172
171. I hope it is clear that of the two coherent choices, I prefer treating costs with more
rigor rather than less—that is, quantifying cost and its uncertainty in order to make system-
atic choices, rather than treating costs impressionistically. I make the same argument, as do
many of the other chapter authors, with respect to how we (should) treat potential job losses
and gains from regulation, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS?, supra note 21.
172. The Perils of Prudence, supra note 35, at 13.
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However, I see various problems with an assumption of neutral-
ity in either risk or cost. First, as discussed in Part IV supra, it
may be folly to believe one can reliably estimate the expected
value without carefully considering the shape of the uncertainty
distribution (at which point reporting only the mean and censor-
ing the distributional information is a form of willful ignorance
and public miscommunication). Secondly, the assumption of risk-
neutrality may have some appeal when the currency is that of
(average) individual risk; there is the argument that since individ-
ual risks are themselves probabilities, the expected probability
contains all the same information as an uncertain lottery over that
probability.173 But when the currency involves population risk
(i.e., “body counts”), it is much less clear that the entire uncer-
tainty distribution can sensibly be reduced to its mean. A sizable
literature exists174 on both sides of the proposition that society
should be indifferent between “1000 deaths for sure” and a “1 in
1000 chance of one million deaths.” I find much more persuasive
the arguments that these are quite different, essentially because
the “damage function” is non-linear, with particular societal aver-
sion to possible outcomes in which masses of people might suffer.
Clearly, uncertainty in regulatory cost is more like a lottery over
different outcomes than a way to provide useless detail about the
“probabilities of probabilities.” Third, and most important, the
upper tail of the cost distribution has a disproportionate influence
on decisionmaking—arguably more so than the tail of the risk dis-
tribution.175 As discussed at the end of Part VI supra, when
costs—to the overall economy, and especially to identifiable sec-
tors or firms—exceed a preconceived threshold, they tend to dom-
173. For example, if your chance of death is either 2 in one million or 4 in one million
with equal probability, this may be indistinguishable from reporting the chance as exactly 3
in one million. On the other hand, it seems counter-intuitive and patronizing to insist that “a
probability of a probability” has no salience in all cases, especially in cases where there is a
chance the risk is intolerably large. Do we regard as indistinguishable a situation where your
risk of death is exactly 1 in 1000, versus a situation where 1% of the population (by virtue of
some known physical difference that is not discernible at the level of any individual) faces a
risk of 1 in 10? The latter situation invokes considerations of risk-aversion, as well as con-
cerns about fairness and altruism.
174. See John Broome, The Value of Life and the Value of Population, 9 J. POPULATION ECON.
3 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912
(1993).
175. Adam M. Finkel, Protecting People in Spite of—or Thanks to—the “Veil of Ignorance,” in
GENOMICS AND ENVTL. REG.: SCI., ETHICS, & L. 290, 324 (Richard R. Sharp, Gary E.
Marchant & Jamie A. Grodsky eds., 2008); Cranor & Finkel, supra note 18.
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inate all other considerations of cost (e.g., the rest of the cost
distribution) or of benefit. The extreme concern over costs that
exceed some “acceptable” fraction of revenues, or that arguably
might push firms or subsectors into bankruptcy, implies by defini-
tion that we are not expected-value decisionmakers with respect
to cost.
• A weaker form of the assertion that expected values are sufficient
guideposts for decisionmaking could also contribute to the asym-
metry between attention to risk uncertainty and cost uncertainty.
It is, of course, possible to recognize that expected net benefit
might be uncertain, and yet not advocate for a thorough analysis
of cost uncertainty—either because the preconception holds that
cost uncertainty is small (see supra), or because the criterion for
gauging net benefit under uncertainty is not expansive enough.
For example, Scott Farrow listed as one of the important desider-
ata of economists that “we want sufficient precision to distinguish
positive from negative net benefit values.”176 This could be con-
strued as an expression of a preference for expected values, but
based on discussions with Farrow, I believe he recognizes the fra-
gility of such point-estimate comparisons. However, the phrasing
“distinguish from” does suggest a one-sided focus on how proba-
ble net benefit is to be positive, rather than a full depiction of the
shape and breadth of the pdf for net benefit. If, therefore, regula-
tory economists concentrate on generating two point estimates—a
worst-case estimate (either a “reasonable” worst-case or an ex-
treme value) and a best-case estimate of cost—they can certainly
marry these to similar estimates for benefit (i.e., risk reduction)
and assess whether there is “sufficient” precision to declare net
benefit positive with enough confidence to recommend the corre-
sponding decision. If the endpoint estimates of benefit come
from a pdf that risk analysts have already rigorously generated,
whereas those for costs come from the exercise of asking “how
large (or small) could costs possibly be?,” then the extra rigor on
the risk side would be unused, and the conclusion that net benefit
was positive might fail to be informed by the probability and
magnitude of contrary scenarios.177
176. REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 28, at 184.
177. But see supra note 162 for a cautionary mention about the myopia of caring only
about distinguishing only “positive from negative,” as opposed to “superior from inferior
options.”
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• Perhaps regulatory economists are engaging in strategic behavior:
their emphasis on forcing risk assessors to change from one type
of point estimate to another—from an alleged “upper bound” to
the expected value—has the side effect of allowing economists to
hold tighter to their own point estimates. If economists believe,
rightly or wrongly, that all the uncertainty analysis on the risk
side is a smokescreen, and the risk assessors fixate on the upper
bound, then they may construe the entire CBA enterprise as an
“arms race,” in which the point estimate, not the error bound, is
what matters. I have written previously that the PCCRAM’s en-
thusiasm for pdfs of exposure and warnings against pdfs of toxi-
cologic potency might be explained not as a stark inconsistency,
but as opportunistic178—the conventional wisdom that point esti-
mates of exposure were “conservative” led to enthusiasm for dis-
tributions (the new distributional information would tend to
move the point estimate “leftward” towards less concern), whereas
the worry that point estimates of potency were underestimates
led to eschewing distributional information that might move the
point estimate “rightward.” By the same token, economists con-
cerned about the consistent track record of overestimation of regu-
latory cost179 might shy away from distributions that would tend
to show lower cost estimates dominating the pdf; “leftward” ex-
tension on the cost side leads to more stringent regulation, having
the opposite effect of “leftward” movements in risk.
C. Bureaucratic Explanations
• I believe one of the strongest factors at work here may be the
influence of agency lawyers. Perhaps they are intolerant of uncer-
tainty in cost, and force economists to be overconfident, whereas
they are more accustomed to accepting that risk estimates are un-
certain, like it or not. Alternatively, perhaps they feel ill-
equipped to challenge the science and hence defer, but feel no
such compunction with regard to economics. This may be the “vi-
cious paradox” of CBA: non-experts have the impression that costs are
easy to pin down relative to risks, and this leads to unwarranted over-
confidence in regulatory economics, and perhaps leads to pressure on
regulatory economists to appear confident. More importantly, per-
haps, agency lawyers may also perceive that judges are coming to
178. Finkel, The Joy Before Cooking, supra note 165, at 1208, n.4 (2002).
179. See, e.g., OTA-ENV-635, supra note 69; Goodstein et. al., supra note 71; Finkel, A
Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis, supra note 72.
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accept that a scientific estimate with uncertainty bounds is not a sign of
weakness or of an incomplete job, whereas a dollar figure surrounded by
uncertainty looks like a half-baked conclusion, or even a sign of laziness.
Any appearance of having abandoned the analysis in mid-stream,
of course, is fatal to the prospects for a court to allow a regulation
to stand.
• Inputs to cost estimates often come from agency engineers, who
tend to think in point estimates, and may not respond well to any
after-the-fact requests from agency economists to surround those
estimates with error bars or pdfs.180
• The difficulties that may be caused by the first two factors supra
are exacerbated by the career-path and advancement issue: agency
economists rarely rise to managerial positions, and therefore can’t
impel change that might comport better with the professional
norms of the larger economics community. Richard Williams, a
former FDA economist, surveyed agency regulatory economists,
and noted that
All [those surveyed] thought it was a problem that econo-
mists were “topped out” in their agency. They thought that
this was a significant problem and complained about scien-
tists and lawyers who were at the very top of their organiza-
tion—but no economists ever occupied top positions. One
economist noted that, “you can apply but it is not going to hap-
pen, only [the physical scientists] are going to get managerial
positions.”181
• A related problem is that, in both risk science and regulatory eco-
nomics, it is possible that the best and most creative scholars do
not seek out positions in public service; instead, they gravitate
toward academia. To the extent that civil service positions are
attractive to persons more interested in stable and long-term em-
ployment than in attaining the highest available salaries, this
might skew the distribution away from those who are most able
to “land on their feet” if forced to leave a private-sector position.
This might help explain the asymmetry described in this Article:
risk scientists in regulatory agencies work on risk science,
whereas economists can be assigned either to work on valuation
180. See Dale Hattis & Adam M. Finkel, Barriers to a More Even-Handed Treatment
of Uncertainties in Projected Economic Costs and Health Benefits of Environmental Regula-
tions (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (giving a more complete discussion of this factor).
181. Richard Williams, The Influence of Regulatory Economists in Federal Health and Safety
Agencies 28 (Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Working Paper No. 08-15, 2008)
(emphasis added).
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or on cost, further diluting the pool of the best and most creative
analysts, especially to the extent that valuation is seen as far more
interesting and worthy of attention than cost is (see infra).
• A simple matter of timing and sequencing may also mitigate
against more rigor on the cost side. Because regulatory agencies
tend to view the analytic process as “estimating the cost of
achieving the amount of risk reduction supported by the risk
analysis,” the cost assessment naturally comes later in the process,
when time may be at a premium and resources may be scarce.182
D. Disciplinary Explanations
• Economists may fall prey to “physics envy,”183 and in their desire
to emulate the physicists’ march towards more and more preci-
sion, they may tend to regard the open highlighting of uncertain-
ties as evidence of being farther than desired from the goal of
maximal precision (rather than evidence of reaching a different
goal—that of as much precision as needed or feasible within
constraints).
• Other economists have suggested that it is inappropriate that
their field emulates science at all, as opposed to engineering. Col-
ander put it this way: “Their self-classification as applied scien-
tists leads them to contort their methodological approach to
attempt to make it seem to fit a scientific method . . . not as
rough and ready engineering insights that can be useful in look-
ing at particular problems. Seeing oneself as a scientist under-
mines the humility the actual practice of applied economics
warrants.”184
• With regard to “deep uncertainty”185 (i.e., the large potential er-
rors caused by inappropriate models), more research needs to be
done to probe the possible differences in training between life
182. I appreciate Lisa Robinson as the source of this insight. I have previously written
about the constraints that this risk-focused thinking places on decision-making, and sug-
gested a “solution-focused” alternative in which risk and cost analysis of discrete options
would occur in parallel. Finkel, Solution-Focused Risk Assessment, supra note 22.
183. Andrew W. Lo & Mark T. Mueller, Warning: Physics Envy May be Hazardous to
Your Wealth!, (2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1563882.
184. David Colander, Creating Humble Economists: A Code of Ethics for Economists, 3-4
(Middlebury Economics Working Paper 11-03, 2011), available at http://sandcat.middlebury
.edu/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/1103.pdf.
185. Louis A. (Tony) Cox Jr., Confronting Deep Uncertainties in Risk Analysis, 32 RISK
ANALYSIS 1607, 1607 (2012).
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scientists and economists. I certainly recall in undergraduate
courses both in biochemistry and economics that fundamental
models were introduced as revealed wisdom, without much em-
phasis on the consequences for prediction and for policy if they
were wrong. However, I think it may be much more common for
scientists to explore model uncertainty quantitatively (whether
through scenario analysis or formal model averaging methods),
and am more hard-pressed to identify scholarly papers and
agency documents in economics that present markedly different
alternative predictions calling into question of the central dogmas
of their field.186 And, returning to the theme of an “arms race,”
perhaps economists in regulatory agencies are more wary of giv-
ing stakeholders access to “where the bodies are buried” in terms
of the assumptions that might be incorrect.
• A more recent trend may exacerbate the pre-existing differences
between risk scientists and economists. The rise of “Freako-
nomics”187 as a ticket to fame may put a premium on spending
time finding clever relationships, rather than doing the “grunt
work” of careful analysis of something as seemingly dull as “what
it costs.” This is anecdotal, but I am struck by the fact that RFF
held a competition several years ago for papers to be presented in
a conference on “the frontiers of environmental economics,”188
and none of the papers chosen had anything to do with the esti-
mation of regulatory cost. Is it possible that some problems will
never be solved, because doing so would require admitting that
generations past were in error for having regarded them as solved?
• To the extent that highlighting uncertainty is a hallmark of ana-
lytic humility, it is possible that refusing to do so reflects hubris
within the profession involved. I discern, perhaps unfairly, a ten-
dency among some economists to profess that their training gives
them abilities superior to those trained in the very fields they
have recently begun to comment on. For example, Landsburg
186. See, e.g., Brian Mannix, Employment and Human Welfare: Why Does Benefit-Cost
Analysis Seem Blind to Job Impacts?, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS?, supra note 21 (pointing out
in detail that construing regulatory cost as the cost of compliance to affected businesses is
itself a gross oversimplification—social cost consists of changes in producer and consumer
surplus across the economy—but rare is the regulatory impact analysis that models general-
equilibrium regulatory cost).
187. STEVEN D. LEVITT AND STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EX-
PLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2009).
188. The Frontiers of Environmental Economics, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Events/Frontiers-of-Environmental-Economics.cfm.
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commented in the New York Times on a review of his book The
Armchair Economist that “to suggest [in a review of my book] that
economists ‘are not spending much time with epidemiologists’
and other experts in the fields where we’ve offered unsolicited
contributions . . . overlooks [that] it’s economists, not epidemiol-
ogists or anyone else, who are experts in trading off costs against
benefits.”189 Economist Emily Oster took this even a step further
recently, claiming “I realized that training as a health economist
was in many ways better than training in public health or
medicine for this [discerning which observational studies of
health effects are meritorious and which are not.]”190 If being an
economist confers special insight into “true” correlations and
causal effects in fields where specialized training can be dismissed
as unnecessary or even unhelpful, then perhaps it seems deflating
to announce those “findings” with error bars or admitted
imprecision.
• There may be a correlation between political ideology and toler-
ance of uncertainty, and, at the same time, a correlation between
ideology and the “side” of CBA one works on (i.e., risk or cost).
New neuroscience research suggests that politically conservative
people may tend to see uncertainty as a weakness191—perhaps be-
cause they are more fundamentalist in their spiritual beliefs, and
fundamentalism tends to be at odds with doubt. If economists in
the agencies tend to be more politically conservative than risk
scientists therein, this might explain why they strive to get “the
answer” to the question they are asked, rather than a snapshot of
how uncertain that answer might currently be.
189. Steven Landsburg, Letter to the Editor, The Bedside Economist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2007. Landsburg also wrote that “The principle of comparative advantage explains why
some people become medical doctors, while other, different, people go into fields such as
economics that require at least a minimal ability to reason logically.” STEVEN LANDSBURG,
MORE SEX IS SAFER SEX: THE UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF ECONOMICS 19 (2007). I am not
aware of analogous pronouncements by epidemiologists or toxicologists, for example, pro-
fessing abilities comparable to or superior to those of economists in estimating supply and
demand functions, or gauging regulatory costs, but perhaps they exist and I have failed to
find them.
190. EMILY OSTER, EXPECTING BETTER: HOW TO FIGHT THE PREGNANCY ESTABLISHMENT WITH
FACTS 38 (2013).
191. John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, & Frank J. Sulloway, Political Conser-
vatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003).
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X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE ANALYSIS
OF COST UNCERTAINTY
Regulatory economists could readily adapt long-standing methods to
quantify uncertainty in regulatory cost. In a companion paper,192 we ob-
serve that there exist two complementary approaches: (1) “bottom-up” anal-
yses, wherein each input to a cost estimate is given a statistical distribution
and the uncertainties are propagated; and (2) “top-down” analyses, wherein
prior experience with respect to cost or an important aspect thereof is used
as raw material to calibrate the work in progress. We note especially that, in
many cases, the pdfs for parameter uncertainty already exist and need only
be transported into a Monte Carlo or similar analysis. For example, when
the cost of an intervention arises from the changes in consumer and pro-
ducer surplus that are in turn caused by an increase in compliance costs for
those producing a good, those estimates of consumer and producer surplus
depend crucially on the estimate of the own-price demand elasticity of the
good. The regression equations that approximate elasticity naturally provide
an estimate of its standard error—an ideal input to a propagation-of-error
model.
In another companion piece,193 we discuss methods that can simultane-
ously help correct for bias (i.e., misestimation), as well as for over- or
under-confidence in the presentation of uncertainty.
CONCLUSIONS
Our cost-benefit edifice—in which billions of dollars and tens of
thousands of lives hang in the balance—is not “equi-sturdy,”194 and this may
be a huge problem—both an intellectual concern and a welfare concern.
This Article and the others under the umbrella of our NSF project attempt
to shed light on the disparities between risk science and regulatory econom-
ics as analytic pursuits, and to probe the genesis of these disparities. Pre-
cisely because “what it costs” may seem mundane, we need to be sure we get
this half of the problem right, or at least as right as we get the other half.
But getting the costs—along with their uncertainties, their interindividual
distribution, and the effects on real welfare that they impel—right is inter-
esting and hard work.
192. Dale Hattis & Adam M. Finkel, Barriers to a More Even-Handed Treatment of
Uncertainties in Projected Economic Costs and Health Benefits of Environmental Regula-
tions (2013) (unpublished manuscript).
193. Jack Siegrist, Scott Ferson & Adam M. Finkel, Advanced Bias Correction: Factor-
ing out Bias and Overconfidence (2013) (unpublished manuscript).
194. Siegrist et al., Ravnoprochnost, supra note 19.
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As a comment on the respective roles of risk scientists and regulatory
economists in the federal and state regulatory systems, as well as the inter-
actions among these professionals, this Article takes the view that regula-
tory economists have helped impel needed improvements in risk assessment
methods,195 while also largely being responsible for inventing and populariz-
ing the myth that risk assessment routinely yields very “conservative” esti-
mates. Rather than hoping that scientists turn the tables and spend time
hectoring economists to improve their analytic performance, I suggest that
change should come from within, led by those economists who are unsatis-
fied with the sort of cost-benefit analyses in which cost appears to be the
poor stepchild.
Ultimately, and notwithstanding all the discussion in this Article about
estimation, honesty, and transparency, quantifying the uncertainties in reg-
ulatory costs is most important because it can help break the vicious circle
of mediocre decisions driven by mediocre analysis.196 It may be true that a
point estimate of cost is all that is needed to show that the benefits of taking
one particular action exceed its costs. (If so, one hastens to ask whether all
the ornate work to characterize uncertainty in benefit is needed, too, but
that is a depressing response to the asymmetry.) What, though, do we really
learn from a confident statement that “doing X is better or worse than doing
nothing?” It would be far better, I contend, to ask probing questions com-
paring X to Y, to Z, and to other options, any of which may be more wel-
fare-maximizing than “X or not X.”197 To fix traditional cost-benefit
analysis, we need better cost analysis, which currently suffers from too little
rigor (as compared to risk analysis). We also need improved cost analysis to
finally allow us to answer questions about how to identify, implement, and
evaluate sustainable solutions to our litany of unresolved environmental,
health, and safety problems.
195. In this regard, I agree with Sandra Hoffmann that “if economists view their role as
limited to the evaluation of costs and benefits or analysis of economic impacts of policy, they
may not pause to think about how their field could improve risk modeling.” Supra note 19, at
1352. I simply urge them to think as well, and perhaps more often, about how their field
could improve economic modeling.
196. See Finkel, I Thought You’d Never Ask, supra note 10.
197. See Finkel, Solution-Focused Risk Assessment, supra note 22.
